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Essays On Health Care Markets
Abstract
The two chapters of my dissertation develop and estimate economic models to analyze the demand for and
the provision of health care services. Specifically, I analyze the optimal design of health care markets to
promote higher quality and lower cost, which can have profound implications for the well-being of people.
The first chapter, ``An Equilibrium Analysis of the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," uses a model of family
interactions to explain why the long-term care insurance market has not been growing. By developing and
estimating a structural model of family interactions, I study how family care affects the workings of the long-
term care insurance market. I argue that private information about the availability of family care induces
adverse selection where individuals with limited access to family care heavily select into insurance coverage. I
demonstrate that pricing on family demographics substantially mitigates adverse selection by reducing the
amounts of private information. I propose child demographic-based pricing as an alternative risk adjustment
that could decrease the average premium, invigorate the market, and generate welfare gains.
The second chapter, ``Partial Rating Area Offering in the ACA Marketplaces," joint with Hanming Fang,
studies insurance companies' plan offering decisions in the marketplaces established by the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). Under the ACA, insurance companies can vary premiums by
``rating areas" which usually consist of multiple counties. In a given rating area, the ACA mandates uniform
pricing for all counties, but, it does not mandate universal offering. We first demonstrate that it is not
uncommon to observe insurance companies selling plans to only a subset of counties within a rating area.
Using both theoretical and empirical approaches, we find evidence that partial rating area coverage is
explained by insurers' incentive to risk screen consumers. While the ACA allows price discrimination based
on rating areas and not on counties, we argue that insurers are effectively price discriminating consumers
based on counties by endogenously determining their service area within a rating area.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON HEALTH CARE MARKETS
Ami Ko
Hanming Fang
The two chapters of my dissertation develop and estimate economic models to analyze
the demand for and the provision of health care services. Specifically, I analyze the optimal
design of health care markets to promote higher quality and lower cost, which can have
profound implications for the well-being of people.
The first chapter, “An Equilibrium Analysis of the Long-Term Care Insurance Mar-
ket,” uses a model of family interactions to explain why the long-term care insurance
market has not been growing. By developing and estimating a structural model of family
interactions, I study how family care affects the workings of the long-term care insurance
market. I argue that private information about the availability of family care induces
adverse selection where individuals with limited access to family care heavily select into
insurance coverage. I demonstrate that pricing on family demographics substantially
mitigates adverse selection by reducing the amounts of private information. I propose
child demographic-based pricing as an alternative risk adjustment that could decrease
the average premium, invigorate the market, and generate welfare gains.
The second chapter, “Partial Rating Area Offering in the ACA Marketplaces,” joint
with Hanming Fang, studies insurance companies’ plan offering decisions in the market-
places established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA).
iv
Under the ACA, insurance companies can vary premiums by “rating areas” which usu-
ally consist of multiple counties. In a given rating area, the ACA mandates uniform
pricing for all counties, but, it does not mandate universal offering. We first demonstrate
that it is not uncommon to observe insurance companies selling plans to only a subset of
counties within a rating area. Using both theoretical and empirical approaches, we find
evidence that partial rating area coverage is explained by insurers’ incentive to risk screen
consumers. While the ACA allows price discrimination based on rating areas and not on
counties, we argue that insurers are effectively price discriminating consumers based on
counties by endogenously determining their service area within a rating area.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The two chapters of my dissertation develop and estimate economic models to analyze
the demand for and the provision of health care services. I analyze the optimal design of
health care markets to promote higher quality and lower cost, which can have profound
implications for the well-being of people.
1.1 “An Equilibrium Analysis of the Long-Term Care Insurance Mar-
ket”
Over 55 percent of 65-year-olds will incur on average $100,000 in long-term care expenses
in their remaining life. Yet only 13 percent of the elderly own private long-term care
insurance. Along with relatively low coverage rates, the long-term care insurance market
has undergone dramatic changes in premiums and in market structure over the last couple
of years. The average premium more than doubled and the number of insurance companies
selling policies plunged from over one hundred to a dozen. The primary goal of this paper
1
is to understand how informal care provided by the family can explain the small size of
the long-term care insurance market and to explore welfare-improving policies. A second
goal of this paper is to understand the reasons for the recent premium increases.
To achieve these goals, I develop and estimate a dynamic non-cooperative model of
an elderly parent and an adult child. The parent has preferences over informal and
formal care and may value leaving a bequest to the child. The parent makes savings
decisions and can have formal care paid by Medicaid if eligible. The child may provide
informal care out of altruism or to protect her bequest from formal care expenses. The
child’s cost of providing informal care includes forgone labor income and a psychological
burden, which may vary by the child’s demographics. Among other things, the parent’s
long-term care insurance decision is affected by the likelihood of receiving informal care
and the chance of becoming Medicaid eligible. The model is estimated using data from
the Health and Retirement Study 1998-2010 by the conditional choice probability (CCP)
estimation method. Estimation is based on actual premium data over the sample period.
Then, I use the estimated model to analyze the counterfactual competitive equilibrium of
the long-term care insurance market.
In the first set of counterfactuals, I examine mechanisms by which informal care
accounts for the small size of the long-term care insurance market and explore welfare-
increasing policies. There are two main results. First, private information about the
availability of informal care creates substantial adverse selection. In equilibrium, the
market only serves high-risk individuals with limited access to informal care. To reduce
market inefficiencies arising from adverse selection, I evaluate counterfactual pricing on
child demographics that are predictive of family care. Counterfactual results show that
2
child demographic-based pricing increases the equilibrium coverage rate by 56 percent,
decreases the average premium by 16 percent, and creates welfare gains. These welfare
gains are generated by expanding insurance coverage to low-risk individuals who never-
theless value financial protection against formal care risk. Second, there is a family moral
hazard effect of insurance and children reduce informal care by almost 20 percent in re-
sponse to their parents’ insurance coverage. This is because insurance protects bequests
from formal care expenses and therefore undermines children’s informal care incentives.
Family moral hazard results in strategic non-purchase of insurance where parents forgo
insurance to elicit more informal care from children. I find that family moral hazard
reduces the equilibrium ownership rate by 41 percent.
In the second set of counterfactuals, I provide explanations for the recent premium
increases in the insurance market. I demonstrate that the average empirical premium
before the recent hikes was below the break-even level by 80 percent. I show that the
initial risk classification practices of insurance companies underestimated the magnitude
of adverse selection and family moral hazard, leading to such underpricing. I further
demonstrate that the decreasing availability of informal care for more recent birth cohorts
increases the formal care risk of the elderly and puts upward pressure on the equilibrium
premium. Without changes in the pricing practices of insurance companies, the model
predicts constant premium increases as the ratio of the elderly to working-age population
increases.
3
1.2 “Partial Rating Area Offering in the ACA Marketplace”
The ACA requires that insurers vary premiums only by age, smoking status and “rating
area” which usually consists of multiple counties. In a given rating area, the ACA man-
dates uniform pricing for all counties, but, it does not mandate universal offering. We
document the prevalence of a phenomenon that we label as partial rating area offering
where plans are not sold to all counties within a given rating area. Using individual health
plans sold in 34 states with federally-facilitated marketplaces, we find that 57 percent of
plans are not sold to all counties in a rating area. We hypothesize two explanations for
this phenomenon: 1) insurers may selectively offer plans in order to risk screen consumers,
and 2) insurers may use partial rating area offering as a way to avoid competition. We find
theoretical and empirical evidence that partial rating area offering is better explained by
the risk screening hypothesis. We demonstrate that while the ACA regulation allows price
discrimination based on rating areas and not on counties, insurers are effectively price
discriminating consumers based on counties by endogenously determining their service
area within a rating area.
4
Chapter 2
An Equilibrium Analysis of the
Long-Term Care Insurance
Market
2.1 Introduction
Long-term care is one of the largest financial risks faced by elderly Americans. Almost
60 percent of 65-year-olds will spend on average $100,000 on formal long-term care ser-
vices, including nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and home health aides (Kemper,
Komisar, and Alecxih, 2005/2006). Long-term care insurance provides financial protec-
tion against this formal care risk. Yet only 13 percent of the elderly own long-term care
insurance. Along with relatively low coverage rates, the long-term care insurance mar-
ket has undergone dramatic changes in premiums and in market structure over the last
couple of years. The average premium more than doubled, and the number of insurance
5
companies selling policies plunged from over 100 to a dozen.
The primary goal of this paper is to understand how the availability of informal care
provided by families can explain the small size of the long-term care insurance market
and to explore welfare-improving policies. A secondary goal is to understand the reasons
for recent premium increases. There are two main mechanisms by which informal care
can account for the limited size of the insurance market. First, despite the fact that
most long-term care is provided informally by adult children, long-term care insurance
companies do not price on child demographics. This can result in adverse selection where
in equilibrium, the market only serves high-risk individuals with limited access to family
care. Second, the desire to use bequests as an effective instrument to elicit informal care
can reduce the demand for insurance. If children provide care in part to protect bequests
from formal care expenses, then long-term care insurance undermines this informal care
incentive as it pays for formal care expenses. If parents prefer informal care to formal care,
then they will demand less insurance to avoid distorting children’s caregiving incentives.
I first present empirical facts that suggest that there is adverse selection based on the
availability of informal care in the long-term care insurance market. I show that condi-
tional on information used by long-term care insurance companies for pricing, individuals’
beliefs about the availability of informal care are negatively correlated with formal care
risk and long-term care insurance coverage. Next, I present suggestive evidence that chil-
dren provide care in part to protect bequests from formal care expenses. I show that
parents who have financial protection against formal care expenses from long-term care
insurance or Medicaid are less likely to receive care from children.
Motivated by these facts, I develop and estimate a model that is a dynamic non-
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cooperative game between an elderly parent and an adult child who interact over long-
term care decisions. The parent has preferences over informal and formal care and may
value leaving bequests to the child. The parent makes savings decisions and can have for-
mal care paid by Medicaid if eligible. The child may provide informal care out of altruism
or to protect bequests from formal care expenses. The child’s cost of providing informal
care includes forgone labor income and a psychological burden, which may vary by the
child’s demographics. Among other things, the parent’s long-term care insurance decision
is affected by the likelihood of receiving informal care and the chance of becoming Med-
icaid eligible. I use individual-level panel survey data from the Health and Retirement
Study 1998-2010 to structurally estimate the model by conditional choice probability
(CCP) estimation method. Estimation is based on actual premium data over the sam-
ple period. Then, I use the estimated model to analyze the counterfactual competitive
equilibrium of the long-term care insurance market.
In the first set of counterfactuals, I quantify the effects of informal care on equilibrium
coverage rates in the long-term care insurance market and explore welfare-increasing
policies. There are two main results. First, private information about the availability
of informal care creates substantial adverse selection. In equilibrium, the market only
serves high-risk individuals who have limited access to informal care. To reduce market
inefficiencies arising from adverse selection, I evaluate counterfactual pricing on child
demographics that are predictive of family care. Demographic-based pricing is common
in insurance markets, and in fact, long-term care insurance companies started gender-
based pricing in 2013 as an attempt to fight persistent financial losses. Counterfactual
results show that child demographic-based pricing increases the equilibrium coverage rate
7
by 56 percent, decreases the average premium by 16 percent, and creates welfare gains.
These welfare gains are generated by expanding insurance coverage to low-risk individuals
who nevertheless value financial protection against formal care risk. Second, there is a
family moral hazard effect of long-term care insurance and children reduce informal care
in response to their parents’ insurance coverage by 20 percent. This is because insurance
protects bequests from formal care expenses and therefore undermines children’s informal
care incentives. Because parents prefer informal care to formal care, family moral hazard
decreases the demand for insurance. It also puts upward pressure on the equilibrium
premium by increasing formal care risk of the insured. I find that family moral hazard
reduces the equilibrium coverage rate by 41 percent.
In the second set of counterfactuals, I provide explanations for the recent premium
increases in the long-term care insurance market. First, I demonstrate that the average
empirical premium before the recent hikes is below the equilibrium premium by 80 per-
cent. This number coincides with major long-term care insurance companies’ requested
premium increases of 80-85 percent on their older blocks of sales (Carrns, 2015). I show
that the initial risk classification practices of insurance companies underestimated the
magnitude of adverse selection and family moral hazard, leading to such underpricing.
Second, I demonstrate that the declining availability of informal care for more recent birth
cohorts puts upward pressure on the equilibrium premium. As baby boomers replace the
former generation and become the major consumers of the long-term care insurance mar-
ket, the equilibrium premium increases by 10 percent. This is because baby boomers
are at higher risk for using formal care as they have fewer children to rely on for family
care. Without changes in the pricing practices of insurance companies, one could ex-
8
pect constant premium increases as the ratio of the elderly to working-age population
increases.
The findings in this paper have important implications for the viability of insurance
markets. For relatively young insurance markets, such as the long-term care insurance
market, pricing on observables that are powerful predictors of risk is crucial for the mar-
ket’s sustainability. This is because initial financial losses from adverse selection could
trigger insurance companies to exit the market even when there is an interior equilib-
rium.1 In the context of the long-term care insurance market, this paper demonstrates
that pricing on the availability of substitutes that have substantial impacts on the insured
risk can alleviate adverse selection and generate welfare gains. The value of these findings
can be substantial given the aging of the baby boom generation and, consequently, the
increasing needs for long-term care. By reducing private information about family care,
the long-term care insurance market can increase its viability and continue to provide
elderly Americans with insurance against one of their largest financial risks.
This paper contributes to several distinct literatures. First, it is related to the lit-
erature on private information in insurance markets. Classical models in the literature
assume one-dimensional heterogeneity in risk and analyze adverse selection based on ex-
pected risk (Akerlof, 1970; Pauly, 1974; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). There is a growing
empirical literature that stresses the importance of heterogeneity in risk preferences such
as risk aversion (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Cohen and Einav, 2007), cognitive abil-
ity (Fang, Keane, and Silverman, 2008), desire for wealth after death (Einav, Finkelstein,
1For example, recent exits of insurance companies from the health insurance exchanges after incurring
losses for the first couple of years hint at the importance of getting the pricing right in the first place.
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and Schrimpf, 2010), and moral hazard (Einav, Finkelstein, Ryan, Schrimpf, and Cullen,
2013). My analysis contributes to this strand of the literature by allowing selection on risk
as well as selection on wealth. As argued in Brown and Finkelstein (2008), the presence
of means-tested Medicaid renders wealth an important factor in determining the willing-
ness to pay for long-term care insurance. By developing a model of insurance choice that
incorporates risk heterogeneity as well as wealth heterogeneity, this paper promotes a
better understanding of selection in private insurance markets in the presence of public
insurance programs.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on strategic bequest motives and
insurance choices. Theoretical studies in the literature argue that when parents can use
bequests to elicit favorable actions from their children, they may forgo financial protection
against risk to avoid distorting children’s incentives (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers,
1985; Pauly, 1990; Zweifel and Struwe, 1996; Courbage and Zweifel, 2011). The empirical
evidence favors this argument. Work by Cox (1987), Cox and Rank (1992), and Norton,
Nicholas, and Huang (2013) finds evidence for strategic inter-vivos transfers, and in the
context of long-term care, Brown (2006) and Groneck (2016) find evidence that caregiving
children are rewarded with more bequests. Despite such empirical evidence, there is no
study that structurally quantifies the effect of strategic bequest motives on the insurance
choices of the elderly. I fill this gap by developing and structurally estimating a non-
cooperative model in which family members interact over insurance decisions with both
strategic and altruistic motives.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the small size of the long-
term care insurance market. Most studies in this field focus on factors that limit the
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demand for insurance. Brown and Finkelstein (2008) find that Medicaid imposes a large
implicit tax on long-term care insurance for low-wealth individuals, and Lockwood (2016)
finds that altruistic bequest motives reduce the demand for long-term care insurance by
lowering the cost of precautionary savings. Studies on the supply side of the market find
high mark-ups (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007) and they propose substantial amounts of
private information (Hendren, 2013) as an explanation for the small size of the market. I
provide new explanations by analyzing the effects of family care on equilibrium outcomes
in the long-term care insurance market. Recent work by Mommaerts (2015) estimates
a cooperative model of the family with limited commitment and shows that family care
reduces the overall demand for long-term care insurance. In contrast to her work, I esti-
mate a non-cooperative model of the family with rich family heterogeneity and examine
how adverse selection based on informal care and family moral hazard affect equilibrium
outcomes. I show that private information about the availability of informal care and
strategic motives of the family, both of which are absent in Mommaerts (2015), have
important effects on the long-term care insurance market.2
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents empirical facts about
long-term care in the U.S. Section 2.3 presents the model. Section 2.4 presents the data
and the estimation results. Section 2.5 presents the main results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2This paper is also related to the literature on family care arrangements (Kaplan, 2012; Fahle, 2014;
Skira, 2015; Barczyk and Kredler, 2016) and the literature on the effects of health risks on elderly savings
(Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; Palumbo, 1999; De Nardi, French, and Jones, 2010; Kopecky and
Koreshkova, 2014).
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2.2 Empirical Facts
I start by providing empirical facts about long-term care in the U.S. The main data
for this paper come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which surveys a
representative sample of Americans over the age of 50 every two years since 1992. I use
seven interviews from the HRS 1998-2010. I present evidence that private information
about the availability of informal care is a source of adverse selection in the long-term
care insurance market. Next, I show data patterns that suggest that bequests may be
important in shaping children’s informal care incentives. Finally, I present evidence on
underpricing of insurance products that cannot be explained by existing studies on the
supply of long-term care insurance.
2.2.1 Long-Term Care in the U.S.
I first provide a brief background on the long-term care sector in the U.S. For more
institutional details, see Commission on Long-Term Care (2013), Society of Actuaries
(2014), and Fang (2016).
Long-term care risk. Long-term care is formally defined as assistance with basic per-
sonal tasks of everyday life, called Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) or Instrumental
Activities of Daily Living (IADLs). Examples of ADLs include bathing, dressing, using
the toilet, and getting in and out of bed. IADLs refer to activities that require more skills
than ADLs such as doing housework, managing money, using the telephone, and taking
medication. Declines in physical or mental abilities are the main reasons for requiring
long-term care. Using individuals aged 60 and over in the HRS 1998-2010, Figure 2.1
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Figure 2.1: Long-Term Care Needs by Age
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Notes: Figure reports the share of respondents who have ADL/IADL limitations or are in the bottom 10
percent of the cognitive score distribution. Sample is limited to individuals aged 60 and over in the HRS
1998-2010.
reports, for each age group, the share of individuals who have ADL/IADL limitations or
are cognitively impaired. Long-term care needs rise sharply with age and 62 percent of
individuals over the age of 85 need assistance with daily tasks. While a substantial share
of the elderly have long-term care needs toward the end of their lives, some people never
experience difficulties with basic daily tasks until death. Using the HRS 1998-2010, I
estimate the Markov transition probabilities of long-term care needs conditional on age
and gender.3 I find that about 26 percent of the elderly will never experience physical
or cognitive disabilities, suggesting that individuals face risks about how much long-term
care they would need.
Informal care. Unpaid long-term care provided by the family - which I will refer to as
3I provide details about the estimation in Section 2.4.2.
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informal care in this paper - plays a substantial role in the long-term care sector. This is
because unlike acute medical care, long-term care does not require professional training; it
simply refers to assistance with basic personal tasks. Several studies have found evidence
that informal care is the backbone of long-term care delivery in the U.S. For example,
work by Barczyk and Kredler (2016) shows that informal care accounts for 64 percent of
all help hours received by the elderly. Using the HRS 1998-2010, I find that 62 percent
of individuals with long-term care needs receive help from children. This implies that
children play a central role in delivering long-term care to the elderly.
Formal care. Another way to meet one’s long-term care needs is to use formal long-term
care services, such as nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and paid home care. These
formal care services are labor-intensive and costly; the median annual rate is $80,300 for
a semi-private room in a nursing home, $43,200 for assisted living facilities, and $36,500
for paid home care.4 Work by Kemper, Komisar, and Alecxih (2005/2006) shows that
almost 60 percent of 65-year-olds will incur $100,000 in formal care expenses over their
lives. Formal care is therefore one of the largest financial risks faced by elderly Americans.
Long-term care insurance. Private long-term care insurance provides financial pro-
tection against these formal care risks. The long-term care insurance market is relatively
young and modern insurance products were introduced in the late 1980s.5 Typical long-
term care insurance policies cover both facility care and paid home care provided by
employees of home care agencies; most policies do not cover informal care. Policies are
4See Genworth (2015). The cost estimate for paid home care assumes that the help is used for 5 hours
per day.
5National Care Planning Council, https://www.longtermcarelink.net/.
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guaranteed renewable and specify a constant and nominal annual premium. Premiums
are conditional on age, gender, and underwriting class determined by health conditions.
Gender-based pricing is new and started in 2013. The average purchase age is 60 years,
but most people do not use insurance until they turn 80 (Broker World, 2009-2015). De-
spite substantial formal care risks, the private long-term care insurance market is small;
I find that the insurance coverage rate is only 13 percent among individuals aged 60 and
over in the HRS 1998-2010.
Sources of formal care payments. Formal long-term care expenses totaled over $200
billion in 2011, which is about 1.4 percent of GDP (Commission on Long-Term Care,
2013). There are three main sources of payments. First, long-term care insurance covers
about 12 percent. The role of private insurance is small due to the low coverage rates.
Second, Medicaid covers over 60 percent. Medicaid is a means-tested public insurance
program and pays formal care costs for individuals with limited resources. At $123 billion
in 2011, Medicaid spending on long-term care imposes severe fiscal constraints at both
state and federal government levels (Commission on Long-Term Care, 2013). Third, out-
of-pocket money covers about 22 percent. This suggests that self-insurance in the form
of savings is an important way by which elderly individuals prepare for formal care risks.
2.2.2 Private Information in the Long-Term Care Insurance Market
Despite the fact that informal care plays a critical role in delivering long-term care, long-
term care insurance companies do not collect any information about children from their
consumers. This is not because of regulation as there are no restrictions on the character-
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istics that may be used in pricing (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007). I now provide evidence
that conditional on information used by insurance companies for pricing, subjective be-
liefs about the availability of informal care are powerful predictors of formal care risk and
long-term care insurance coverage.6
I use the HRS question that asks about the availability of future informal care: “Sup-
pose in the future, you needed help with basic personal care activities like eating or
dressing. Will your daughter/son be willing and able to help you over a long period of
time?” I use an individual’s answer to this question as a measure of his beliefs about
the availability of informal care. The HRS also asks individuals about their self-assessed
probability of entering a nursing home: “What is the percent chance (0-100) that you will
move to a nursing home in the next five years?” Several studies have used this question
to construct a measure of private information about formal care risk (Finkelstein and
McGarry, 2006; Hendren, 2013). I examine the predictive power of beliefs about informal
care as well as the predictive power of beliefs about nursing home entry by estimating the
following probit equations:
Pr(NHi,t∼t+6 = 1) = Φ(α1B
IC
it + β1B
NH
it +Xitγ1) and (2.2.1)
Pr(LTCIit = 1) = Φ(α2B
IC
it + β2B
NH
it +Xitγ2). (2.2.2)
The term NHi,t∼t+6 is an indicator for staying in a nursing home for more than 100 nights
in the next six years since the interview.7 LTCIit is an indicator for current long-term
6The empirical strategy used in this section follows that in Finkelstein and McGarry (2006).
7Short-term nursing home stays following acute hospitalization are covered by Medicare up to 100
days. To distinguish nursing home stays that are covered by private long-term care insurance from those
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Table 2.1: Beliefs about Informal Care, Nursing Home Use, and Insurance Coverage
(1) (2)
Believe Do not believe
children will help children will help
Subsequent NH Use 0.014 0.024
LTCI 0.139 0.186
Observations 2553 2552
Notes: Column (1) reports the subsequent nursing home (NH) utilization rate and the
long-term care insurance (LTCI) coverage rate of respondents who believe their children
will help with long-term care needs. Column (2) reports the nursing home utilization
and insurance coverage rates of respondents who do not believe their children will help.
Sample is limited to individuals with children who are between ages 70-75 and do not
have rejection conditions based on underwriting guidelines in Hendren (2013).
care insurance holdings. BICit is an indicator for whether the individual thinks children
will help. If the individual believes some child will help, I set BICit to one. If the individual
believes no child will help, then I set BICit to zero. B
NH
it is the individual’s self-assessed
probability of entering a nursing home rescaled to be between zero and one. Xit is a
vector of individual characteristics used by insurance companies for pricing that includes
age, gender, and various health conditions.8 Xit does not include any information about
children as such information is not collected by insurance companies.
I restrict the sample to individuals who are healthy enough to buy long-term care
insurance at the time of interview, and old enough to have long-term care needs over
the next six years since the interview. I use individuals aged 70-75 who have children
and do not have conditions that render them ineligible to buy long-term care insurance.9
Table 2.1 reports the subsequent nursing home utilization rate and the long-term care
covered by Medicare, I use nursing home stays lasting more than 100 nights.
8I follow Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Hendren (2013) to control for pricing covariates.
9I follow Hendren (2013) to identify rejection conditions. I exclude individuals who have ADL/IADL
limitations, have experienced a stroke, or have used nursing homes or paid home care in the past.
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Table 2.2: Results from the Asymmetric Information Test
(1) (2)
Subsequent NH use LTCI
Believe children will help -0.010∗∗ (0.004) -0.041∗∗∗ (0.012)
Subjective prob of future NH use (0-1) -0.011 (0.012) 0.186∗∗∗ (0.029)
Female 0.063 (0.157) 0.350 (0.390)
Age 0.004∗∗ (0.002) 0.004 (0.004)
Female*Age -0.001 (0.002) -0.005 (0.005)
Psychological condition 0.004 (0.007) -0.017 (0.024)
Diabetes 0.019∗∗∗ (0.005) -0.035∗ (0.019)
Lung disease 0.010 (0.007) -0.059∗∗ (0.025)
Arthritis -0.008∗ (0.004) -0.000 (0.013)
Heart disease -0.002 (0.005) -0.014 (0.017)
Cancer 0.000 (0.006) -0.017 (0.018)
High blood pressure 0.005 (0.004) -0.013 (0.014)
Cognitive score (0-1) -0.106∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.324∗∗∗ (0.050)
Observations 5105 5105
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects from probit estimation of Equations (2.2.1) and (2.2.2).
Standard errors are clustered at the household level and are reported in parentheses. Dependent variable
in Column (1) is an indicator for staying in a nursing home for more than 100 nights in the next 6
years. Mean is 0.019. Dependent variable in Column (2) is an indicator for long-term care insurance
ownership. Mean is 0.163. Sample is limited to individuals with children who are between ages 70-75
and do not have rejection conditions based on underwriting guidelines in Hendren (2013). ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
insurance coverage rate of the sample broken down by their beliefs about the availability
of informal care. About one half of the sample believes children will help. These beliefs
appear reasonable because in the data, about 60 percent of respondents with long-term
care needs actually receive care from their children. Individuals who believe children
will help are less likely to enter a nursing home in the future and to own long-term care
insurance.
Table 2.2 reports the results from probit estimation. Column (1) shows that individ-
ual beliefs about the availability of informal care are powerful predictors of subsequent
nursing home use. Individuals who believe their children will help are 1 percentage point
less likely to enter a nursing home in the future. This is a substantial effect as 2 percent of
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the sample use nursing homes in the next 6 years.10 What is surprising is that individual
beliefs about nursing home entry have no power in predicting subsequent nursing home
use - the relationship is indeed negative and statistically insignificant.11 If beliefs about
nursing home entry reflect information about unobserved health conditions, the insignifi-
cant relationship suggests that the amounts of private information about health are small.
Column (2) indicates that there is a negative and significant relationship between beliefs
about the availability of informal care and insurance holdings. Individuals who believe
their children will help are 4 percentage points less likely to own long-term care insurance.
Given the coverage rate of 16 percent among the sample, this finding serves as evidence
that private information about informal care has a substantial effect on insurance choices.
Taken together, Table 2.2 provides evidence that (1) the dimension of private infor-
mation that could be the most relevant to insurance companies is private information
about the availability of informal care, and (2) individuals with less access to informal
care are more likely to select into insurance, creating potential adverse selection.
2.2.3 Informal Care and Bequests
I now provide descriptive statistics that suggest that bequests may play an important role
in shaping the caregiving incentives of children. Given the costly nature of formal care,
10The negative and significant correlation between beliefs about informal care and subsequent nursing
home use holds true when I measure nursing home use over a longer time horizon.
11This result is consistent with Hendren (2013), who finds little predictive power of beliefs about nursing
home entry among individuals who are eligible to buy long-term care insurance. The fact that beliefs
about the availability of informal care have predictive power, while beliefs about nursing home entry do
not, suggests individuals’ imperfect ability to incorporate all relevant information in forming these beliefs.
As argued in Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), if BNH is a sufficient statistic for private information about
nursing home use, conditional on BNH , all other individual information (including BIC) should have no
power in predicting nursing home use.
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Figure 2.2: Long-Term Care Insurance Coverage and Medicaid Eligibility by Wealth
Parent wealth quintile
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Notes: Solid line represents the long-term care insurance coverage rate by wealth quintile. Dashed line
represents the share of respondents on Medicaid. Dotted line represents the share of respondents who
have either long-term care insurance or Medicaid benefits. Sample is limited to single respondents aged
60 and over in the HRS 1998-2010.
children may provide care themselves to protect bequests from formal care expenses.
If that is the case, the out-of-pocket costs of formal care that parents face may be an
important factor in children’s caregiving decisions. For example, if parents face zero out-
of-pocket costs of formal care by having full long-term care insurance or being Medicaid
eligible, children will not have any strategic incentive to provide informal care. Based
on this intuition, I look for data patterns that suggest a positive relationship between
informal care provision and the out-of-pocket costs of formal care faced by parents.
Figure 2.2 reports the long-term care insurance coverage rate (solid line) and the
share of Medicaid eligibles (dashed line) by wealth quintile. The long-term care insurance
coverage rate increases in wealth while the share of Medicaid eligibles decreases in wealth.
Individuals in the middle of the wealth distribution face the largest out-of-pocket costs
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Figure 2.3: Informal Care from Children by Parent Wealth
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Notes: Left panel reports the share of respondents receiving care from children, by respondent wealth
quintile. Right panel reports the average monthly care hours provided by children. Sample is limited to
single respondents aged 60 and over who have long-term care needs in the HRS 1998-2010.
of formal care as the share covered by either long-term care insurance or Medicaid is
the lowest. Indeed, Figure 2.3 shows that there is an inverted-U pattern of informal
care; middle-wealth parents receive the most informal care from children at the extensive
and intensive margins. While other factors, such as children’s opportunity costs, may
contribute to the inverted-U pattern of informal care, the positive relationship between
children’s informal care behaviors and parents’ out-of-pocket costs of formal care serves
as suggestive evidence that children may provide informal care to protect bequests from
formal care expenses.12
Several empirical studies also find a significant relationship between bequests and chil-
dren’s informal care behaviors. Brown (2006) uses inclusion in life insurance policies and
12In Appendix A.1, I show further descriptive evidence that long-term care insurance undermines
children’s informal care incentives.
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wills as proxies for bequests and finds that caregiving children are more likely to receive
end-of-life transfers from parents. Groneck (2016) uses the actual bequest data obtained
from the HRS exit interviews and finds a positive and significant correlation between
children’s informal care behaviors and the amounts of the bequests they receive. Moti-
vated by such evidence, this paper develops and estimates a structural model to quantify
how strategic incentives of the family surrounding bequests affect various dimensions of
long-term care decisions.
2.2.4 Recent Changes in the Long-Term Care Insurance Market
The last few years have witnessed drastic changes in the long-term care insurance market,
and there have been debates on the market’s viability. The left panel in Figure 2.4 presents
changes in the average premium of a specific long-term care insurance policy that pays
formal care expenses up to $100 per day for three years.13 From 2008 to 2014, the average
premium of this policy doubled for men and almost tripled for women. The right panel
reports the premium trend of this policy separately for Genworth, which is the biggest
insurance company with more than one third of the market share. The figure shows that
Genworth tripled the premium for men and almost quintupled it for women. Figure 2.4
also reveals that, despite the well-known fact that women are more likely to use formal
care than men (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007), gender-based pricing only started in 2013.
Existing policies were no exceptions to such premium hikes. Long-term care insurance
contracts specify a constant nominal premium that is usually not subject to changes over
13The data are collected by Broker World, and major insurance companies - which account for more
than 90 percent of industry sales - participate in the survey. The data period is from 2008 to 2014. The
drastic changes in the long-term care insurance market started after 2010. The sample period of 2008-2014
is therefore suitable to capture these changes.
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Figure 2.4: Soaring Premiums
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Notes: Figure reports nominal annual premiums for policies with the following features: (1) they are sold
to 60-year-olds who belong to insurance companies’ most common underwriting class, (2) they have a
maximal daily benefit of $100, which increases at the nominal annual rate of 5 percent, (3) they provide
benefits for three years, and (4) they have a 90-day elimination period. Left panel reports the average
premium of policies with these features by year (the number of policies surveyed varies from 15 to 34
across years). Right panel reports changes in Genworth’s product that has the described features. Data
are from Broker World 2009-2015.
the life of the contract. However, state regulators approve premium increases on existing
policies if insurance companies are successful in demonstrating that they had “under-
priced” their products. Most major insurance companies requested premium increases
starting in 2012 and were granted substantial ones. For example, Genworth requested
premium increases of 80 to 85 percent on policies sold before 2011, and had received
approvals from 41 states by the end of 2013 (Carrns, 2014, 2015).
In the midst of insurance companies seeking premium increases, a substantial number
of insurance companies left the market altogether. Using financial data submitted by
the universe of insurance companies operating in the individual long-term care line of
business, I find that out of 128 insurance companies that had in-force policies in 2015,
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only 16 companies are actively in the market, that is, selling new policies.14 According
to an industry report which surveyed insurance companies that had exited the market,
the failure to meet profit objectives was the primary reason for the exit decisions (Cohen,
2012).
In this paper, using an equilibrium model of the long-term care insurance market, I
examine whether premiums before the recent hikes were indeed underpriced. The exist-
ing literature actually has evidence opposite to what insurance companies claim about
underpricing and financial losses. Brown and Finkelstein (2007) use an actuarial model
of formal long-term care utilization probabilities to calculate mark-ups of long-term care
insurance policies sold in 2002. They find that the premiums are above actuarially fair
levels and that insurance companies pay out only 82 cents in benefits for every dollar
they receive in premiums. However, the actuarial model used in their analysis predicts
formal care risk unconditional on ownership status of long-term care insurance, which
may underpredict formal care risk in the presence of adverse selection or family moral
hazard. By estimating a model of insurance selection that incorporates these two factors,
I aim to compute more accurate mark-ups of these policies and provide explanations for
the recent soaring premiums.
2.3 Model
To understand family interactions over long-term care and to explore the possible scope
for welfare-increasing policies, I develop a dynamic non-cooperative game model played
14The data are collected by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and compiled
by SNL Financial. Insurance companies that no longer sell policies still have to honor their existing
policies.
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between a single elderly parent and an adult child.15 The parent makes long-term care
insurance purchase decisions when relatively young and healthy. The child makes labor
market participation decisions, and when the parent has long-term care needs, she decides
how much time to spend on taking care of the parent. If the child does not provide care,
the parent chooses the type of formal care services that she would use. The parent can
have formal care costs paid by Medicaid if eligible. The parent makes savings decisions,
and she leaves a share of her wealth as bequests to the child.
Key features of the model are the following. First, the model describes a non-
cooperative decision-making process of the parent and the child. The non-cooperative
approach is motivated by several studies that find that strategic motives may be im-
portant in understanding long-term care decisions of the family.16 Moreover, almost 70
percent of the children in the data are married. As most parents and children in the data
belong to separate households, it is unrealistic to assume that they cooperate on vari-
ous dimensions of decisions such as consumption, labor market participation, and leisure.
Second, the model incorporates altruism. The parent is altruistic toward the child in that
she may value leaving her wealth to the child. The child is altruistic toward the parent
in that she may derive warm-glow utility from providing informal care. Third, the model
captures the possibility of multiple children providing care in a reduced-form way. In the
data, about one quarter of parents receive care from multiple children, and parents with
many children use nursing homes less compared to parents with few children. Based on
15I assume the parent is single to abstract away from spouse-provided care, and to focus on family
care provided by children. Also, in the data, most of family care received by the elderly comes from adult
children.
16See Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985), Pauly (1990), Zweifel and Struwe (1996), and Courbage
and Zweifel (2011) for theoretical studies, and Brown (2006) and Groneck (2016) for empirical evidence.
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this fact, I allow the parent’s formal care preferences to depend on the number of children
and mitigate the possible bias from describing the informal care behaviors of one child.
Fourth, the model incorporates rich child-level heterogeneity to allow for possible insur-
ance selection based on the availability of informal care. The child’s caregiving utility
and forgone labor market income depend on various child demographics, which result in
heterogeneous informal care incentives. Fifth, Medicaid is incorporated as a means-tested
public program that pays formal care costs for impoverished parents. Lastly, the model
describes the parent’s savings decisions (1) to incorporate self-insurance as an alternative
financial protection against formal care risk, (2) to examine the parent’s bequest motives,
and (3) to determine Medicaid eligibility.
2.3.1 Model Description
The model starts when the single elderly parent (with superscript P ) is 60 years old and
her adult child (with superscript K) is 60-∆ years old. Model period a = 60, 62, ..., 100,
represents the parent’s age and increases biennially.17 The model incorporates three
sources of uncertainty: parent health transitions, parent wealth shocks, and parent and
child choice-specific preference shocks. The state vector, sa, represents variables that are
commonly observed by the family at the beginning of each period a, after the resolution
of uncertainty about parent health and wealth:
sa = (w
P
a , a, ltci
P
a , h
P
a , IcgKa−2=0, e
K
a−2;X)
where X = (femaleP , yP , femaleK , eduK ,marriedK , closeK , homeK , INk≥4).
17This is to match the fact that HRS interviews occur every two years.
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wPa is the parent’s wealth after the wealth shock, ltci
P
a is an indicator for the parent’s
long-term care insurance holdings, hPa is the parent’s health status, IcgKa−2=0 is an indicator
for the child not providing informal care in the previous period, and eKa−2 is the child’s
employment status in the previous period. The parent’s health status can take four
values: the parent can be healthy (hPa = 0), have light long-term care needs (h
P
a = 1),
have severe long-term care needs (hPa = 2), or be dead (h
P
a = 3). The health transition
probabilities follow a Markov chain and depend on the parent’s gender, age, and current
health status.18 X represents a vector of family demographics where femaleP is an
indicator for the parent being female, yP is the parent’s permanent income, femaleK is
an indicator for the child being female, eduK is an indicator for the child having some
college education, marriedK is an indicator for the child being married, closeK is an
indicator for the child living within 10 miles of the parent, homeK is an indicator for the
child being a homeowner, and INk≥4 is an indicator for the parent having four or more
children.
In each period a while the parent is alive, the child makes informal care and employ-
ment decisions. cgKa ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the child’s informal care choice where cgKa = 0 is no
informal care, cgKa = 1 is light informal care, and cg
K
a = 2 is intensive informal care. The
intensity of informal care is defined in terms of time devoted to caregiving. eKa ∈ {0, 1}
is the child’s employment choice where eKa = 0 is not working, and e
K
a = 1 is working
full-time. When the parent is healthy, the child’s informal care choice is set to cgKa = 0.
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18This suggests that the parent’s health transition process is exogenous and does not depend on the
receipt of informal or formal care. This is based on previous studies that find that the evolution of long-
term care needs is largely unaffected by the use of long-term care (Byrne, Goeree, Hiedemann, and Stern,
2009).
19In the data, almost no children provide care to parents without any ADL limitations.
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Let dKa = (cg
K
a , e
K
a ) denote the child’s informal care and employment choices in period a.
The parent moves after observing the child’s choices.20 The parent makes long-term
care insurance purchase and formal care utilization decisions, followed by a consumption
decision. buyPa ∈ {0, 1} is the parent’s once-and-for-all long-term care insurance choice
where buyPa = 1 means purchase, and buy
P
a = 0 means non-purchase. The parent can
buy long-term care insurance only when she is 60 years old and healthy.21 fcPa ∈ {0, 1, 2}
is the parent’s formal care choice where fcPa = 0 is no formal care, fc
P
a = 1 is paid
home care, and fcPa = 2 is nursing homes. The parent can use formal care only when
she has long-term care needs, and the child does not provide care.22 In all other states
(the parent is healthy or the child provides care), the parent does not use formal care.
Let dPa = (buy
P
a , fc
P
a ) denote the parent’s insurance and formal care choices in period a.
Following her discrete choice dPa , the parent chooses consumption c
P
a ∈ R+. In the period
of the parent’s death, the child inherits a share of the parent’s wealth and the model
closes. The parent dies for sure at the age of 100.
Preferences when the parent is alive. The child’s per-period utility while the parent
20I make this sequential-move assumption in order to avoid the potential existence of multiple equilibria
in a simultaneous-move version of the game.
21The average purchase age of long-term care insurance policies is around 60 (Broker World, 2009-
2015), and insurance companies do not sell policies to individuals who already have long-term care needs
(Hendren, 2013).
22In the model, informal and formal care are therefore perfect substitutes. This is based on several
studies (Charles and Sevak, 2005; Coe, Goda, and Van Houtven, 2015) that find strong empirical evidence
for the substitutability of informal and formal care.
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is alive is
π̃K(dKa , sa, ε
K
a ) = θ
K
c log(c
K
a ) + θ
K
l log(l
K
a ) + ω
K(cgKa , sa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
πK(dKa , sa)
+εKa (d
K
a ). (2.3.1)
The child’s per-period utility depends on consumption (cKa ), leisure (l
K
a ), informal care
(cgKa ), and choice-specific preference shocks (ε
K
a ) associated with each possible discrete
choice dKa = (cg
K
a , e
K
a ). The child’s consumption is equal to her income, which is deter-
mined by her work choice and demographics. The child’s leisure is residually determined
by her work and informal care choices. εKa is privately observed by the child and follows
an i.i.d. extreme value type I distribution with scale one. The function ωK represents the
child’s warm-glow utility from providing informal care and captures the child’s possible
altruism toward the parent. For hPa ∈ {1, 2}, ωK is defined as
ωK(cgKa , sa) =

0 if cgKa = 0,
θK
hPa ,cg
K
a
+ θKmaleIfemaleK=0 + θKfarIcloseK=0
+θKstartIcgKa−2=0 if cg
K
a ∈ {1, 2}.
(2.3.2)
The child’s utility from providing no informal care is normalized to zero. The child’s
utility from providing light or intensive informal care depends on the parent’s health status
hPa ∈ {1, 2}. Moreover, the child’s caregiving utility depends on her gender, whether or
not she lives within 10 miles of the parent, and whether or not she provided care to the
parent in the previous period.23 As the child’s informal care choice is set to cgKa = 0
23In the data, the informal care behaviors of children vary substantially by gender and residential
proximity. Also, there is persistence in caregiving behaviors in that children who provide care tend to
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when the parent is healthy, I normalize ωK to zero for hPa = 0.
24
The parent’s per-period utility when she is alive is given by
π̃P (dKa , d
P
a , c
P
a , sa, ε
P
a ) = θ
P
c log(ĉ
P
a ) + ω
P (cgKa , fc
P
a , sa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
πP (dKa , d
P
a , c
P
a , sa)
+εPa (d
P
a ). (2.3.3)
ĉPa is the sum of the parent’s consumption spending and the consumption value from
residing in a nursing home (cnh) :
ĉPa = c
P
a + cnhIfcPa =2. (2.3.4)
The parent’s per-period utility depends on this total consumption value, the child’s infor-
mal care choice (cgKa ), the parent’s formal care choice (fc
P
a ), and choice-specific preference
shocks (εPa ) associated with each possible discrete choice d
P
a = (buy
P
a , fc
P
a ).
25 εPa is pri-
vately observed by the parent and follows an i.i.d. extreme value type I distribution with
scale one. The function ωP represents the parent’s utility from informal and formal care.
For hPa = 0, I normalize ω
P to zero as the parent does not use any long-term care when
continue to do so.
24As the parent’s health transition is exogenous, this normalizing value has no impact on the child’s
choices.
25The parent’s per-period utility does not include leisure utility. This is because I assume the parent
is retired and spends her total available time on leisure. As I assume additively separable leisure utility,
including leisure utility has no impact on the parent’s choices.
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she is healthy.26 For hPa ∈ {1, 2}, ωP is defined as
ωP (cgKa , fc
P
a , sa) =

0 if cgKa ∈ {1, 2},
θP
hPa
if cgKa = 0 and fc
P
a = 0,
θP
hPa
+ θP
hPa ,fc
P
a ,INk≥4
if cgKa = 0 and fc
P
a ∈ {1, 2}.
(2.3.5)
The parent’s utility from receiving informal care is normalized to zero. If the parent
chooses not to use any formal care when the child does not provide care, then she ex-
periences θP
hPa
. So θP
hPa
can be interpreted as the parent’s disutility from not receiving
any long-term care when her health status is hPa ∈ {1, 2}. If the parent uses formal care
fcPa ∈ {1, 2}, then she experiences a utility gain of θPhPa ,fcPa ,INk≥4
. This formal care utility
depends on the parent’s health status and whether or not she has four or more children.
This is to reflect the possibility that the child within the model may not be the only source
of informal care, and to rationalize the data pattern that parents with many children use
less formal care. As the parent’s utility from receiving informal care is normalized to zero,
levels of θP
hPa
+ θP
hPa ,fc
P
a ,INk≥4
can be interpreted as how much the parent prefers formal
care to informal care.27
Preferences when the parent is dead. In the case of the parent’s death, she leaves
her wealth to the family and derives bequest utility. Following Lockwood (2016), I pa-
26As previously mentioned, this normalizing value has no impact on the model as the health transition
probabilities are exogenous to the choices made within the model.
27The parent’s formal care choices only identify the differences across formal care utilities, i.e.,
θPhPa ,fcPa ,INk≥4
. θPhPa
is identified from the parent’s long-term care insurance purchase and consumption
choices. I discuss identification of these parameters in Section 2.4.4.
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rameterize the parent’s altruistic bequest utility as
πPd (w
P
a ) = (θ
P
d )
−1wPa . (2.3.6)
Bequests are luxury goods and the parent is less risk-averse over bequests than over
consumption. This parametrization is useful in that it has an easy-to-interpret parameter,
θPd . As I assume utility from consumption c is θ
P
c log(c), for a parent in a two-period model
who dies for sure in the second period and decides between consumption and bequests,
θPc θ
P
d can be interpreted as the threshold consumption below which she does not leave
any bequests.28
I use two empirical facts to determine the child’s share of bequests. First, caregiving
children, on average, receive bequest amounts that are twice as much as those received
by non-caregiving children (Groneck, 2016). Second, the average number of children in
the data is around three. Based on these, I assume that the child in the model inherits
one half of the parent’s wealth. The model closes when the parent dies and the child’s
terminal value is given as
πKd (w
P
a ) = θ
K
d Π
K
d (0.5w
P
a ). (2.3.7)
The function ΠKd represents the child’s inheritance value. This is calculated by assuming
that the child optimally allocates and consumes the bequests over the next T0 periods.
Details on how I compute ΠKd are given in Appendix A.2.
28θPc and θ
P
d are not separately identified from the parent’s consumption choices. The parent’s discrete
choices (insurance purchase and formal care choices) separately identify these two structural parameters.
I discuss identification in Section 2.4.4.
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Long-term care insurance and Medicaid. I consider one standardized long-term
care insurance policy. The features of this policy are based on typical long-term care
insurance products sold during my sample period (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007; Broker
World, 2009-2015). The policy is sold to healthy 60-year-olds, covers both paid home care
and nursing homes, has a maximal per-period benefit cap b, and provides benefits for life.
The policy pays benefits for formal care expenses only when the parent has long-term
care needs. If the parent owns the long-term care insurance policy, she pays a constant
premium, p, in every period when she is not receiving benefits. Premium payments are
waived when the parent is receiving insurance benefits.
After receiving benefits from long-term care insurance, if any, the parent’s out-of-
pocket cost of formal care is xfcPa ,hPa − min{b, xfcPa ,hPa } where xfcPa ,hPa is the price for
formal care fcPa in health status h
P
a . The parent can reduce the out-of-pocket cost if she
is Medicaid eligible by satisfying the following means test:
wPa + y
P −
(
xfcPa ,hPa −min{b, xfcPa ,hPa }
)
≤ w̄fcPa . (2.3.8)
Medicaid requires that the parent’s net resources after paying the out-of-pocket cost of
formal care be less than w̄fcPa . This threshold depends on the parent’s formal care choice,
as the resource threshold for paid home care is substantially higher than that for nursing
home care.29 If the parent is Medicaid eligible, then her out-of-pocket cost of formal care
29The modal income threshold for paid home care was $545 per month, while it was only $30 per
month for nursing homes in 1999 (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008).
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is reduced to max{0, wPa + yP − w̄fcPa } and Medicaid pays the remaining cost:
xfcPa ,hPa −min{b, xfcPa ,hPa } −max{0, w
P
a + y
P − w̄fcPa }.
Two important features of Medicaid emerge. First, Medicaid is a secondary payer by law.
So if the parent has private long-term care insurance and is also Medicaid eligible, long-
term care insurance pays first, then Medicaid. This suggests that from the perspective
of insurance companies, the parent’s Medicaid eligibility is irrelevant as Medicaid starts
paying only after insurance companies pay out benefits. Second, the parent becomes
Medicaid eligible only after having spent down her net resources to the Medicaid threshold.
Medicaid therefore provides very limited financial protection against formal care risks.
Budget constraints. The parent’s wealth after paying the long-term care insurance
premium and the out-of-pocket cost of formal care, if any, is
w̃Pa =

wPa + y
P −max{0, wPa + yP − w̄fcPa } = min{w
P
a + y
P , w̄fcPa } if Medicaid,
wPa + y
P −
(
xfcPa ,hPa −min{b, xfcPa ,hPa }
)
− p otherwise.
(2.3.9)
To make sure that the parent maintains strictly positive consumption, there is a gov-
ernment transfer up to gfcPa , which depends on the parent’s formal care choice. This
can be thought of as the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, which vary by
beneficiaries’ nursing home residency. The parent’s wealth after this government transfer
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is
ŵPa (sa, d
P
a ) := max{w̃Pa , gfcPa }. (2.3.10)
There is no borrowing and the parent’s consumption is constrained by cPa ≤ ŵPa (sa, dPa ).
The parent’s wealth at the beginning of the next period is given by
wPa+2 = max
{
0, (1 + r)
(
ŵPa (sa, d
P
a )− cPa
)
−mPa+2
}
(2.3.11)
where r is the real per-period interest rate, and mPa+2 is the wealth shock realized at the
beginning of the next period for which the parent is liable up to ŵPa (sa, d
P
a ) − cPa . The
wealth shock follows an i.i.d. normal distribution.
The HRS data provide very limited information about children’s assets. In the data, I
only observe children’s family income and whether or not they own a house. Owing to such
data limitations, I assume the child does not save and consumes all her family income,
yKa .
30 The child’s family income is a deterministic function of the child’s work choice, work
choice in the previous period, and various demographics, including her gender, education,
marital status, and home ownership status:
yKa = f(e
K
a ; sa). (2.3.12)
30The assumption that the child cannot save may underestimate the cost of informal care. This is
because adult children usually provide care when they are in their prime saving years (Barczyk and
Kredler, 2016). Also, the child’s value from bequests may vary by her wealth. While limited, rich child-
level heterogeneity incorporated in the model mitigates these issues. The child’s forgone labor income
and caregiving utility depend on various demographics to better capture her cost of informal care. The
child’s value from bequests also depends on her education level which may be highly correlated with her
wealth.
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The child’s time constraint is
TcgKa + TeKa + l
K
a = Ttotal
where Ttotal is her total available time, TcgKa is the required time for caregiving choice
cgKa , and TeKa is the required time for work choice e
K
a .
2.3.2 Equilibrium
Let σi denote a set of decision rules for player i ∈ {K,P}. For the child, σK =
{σK(sa, εKa )} is a mapping from the common state space, S, and the space of the child’s
private preference shocks, R|C
K |, to the set of the child’s informal care and employment
choices, CK :
σK : S ×R|CK | → CK .
For the parent, σP = (σP,d, σP,c) is composed of decision rules for discrete choices (σP,d)
and consumption (σP,c). The parent makes discrete choices after observing the child’s
choice, so σP,d = {σP,d(sa, dKa , εPa )} is a mapping from the common state space, the child’s
choice set, and the space of the parent’s private preference shocks, R|C
P |, to the set of the
parent’s discrete insurance and formal care choices, CP :
σP,d : S × CK ×R|CP | → CP .
36
The parent chooses consumption after her discrete choices. σP,c = {σP,c(sa, dKa , dPa )} is
a mapping from the common state space, the child’s choice set, and the parent’s set of
discrete choices to the strictly positive real line:31
σP,c : S × CK × CP → R+.
Let Ṽ K(sa, ε
K
a ;σ) denote the child’s value if she behaves optimally today and in the
future when the parent behaves according to her decision rules specified in σ = (σK , σP ).
In states where the parent is dead, with a slight abuse of notation, define Ṽ K = πKd (w
P
a ).
By Bellman’s principle of optimality, the child’s problem in periods where the parent is
alive can be recursively written as
Ṽ K(sa, ε
K
a ;σ) = max
dKa ∈CK(sa)
{
πK(dKa , sa) + ε
K
a (d
K
a ) + βE
[
Ṽ K(sa+2, ε
K
a+2;σ)
∣∣∣ sa, dKa ;σ]}
(2.3.13)
where the expectation is over the parent’s private preference shocks of the current pe-
riod, the parent’s health and wealth shocks of the next period, and the child’s private
preference shocks of the next period. CK(sa) denotes the set of the child’s feasible in-
formal care and employment choices in state sa. Define V
K(sa;σ) as the expected value
function, V K(sa;σ) =
∫
Ṽ K(sa, ε
K
a ;σ)g(ε
K
a ) where g is the probability density function
of εKa . Define the choice-specific value function, v
K(sa, d
K
a ;σ), as the per-period payoff of
31As the parent’s preference shocks (εPa ) are additively separable and serially independent, conditional
on the parent’s discrete choices, these shocks are irrelevant to consumption choices.
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choosing dKa minus the preference shock plus the expected value function:
vK(sa, d
K
a ;σ) = π
K(dKa , sa) + βE
[
V K(sa+2;σ)
∣∣∣sa, dKa ;σ]. (2.3.14)
I similarly define value functions for the parent. Let Ṽ P (sa, d
K
a , ε
P
a ;σ) denote the
parent’s value if the parent behaves optimally today and in the future when the child
behaves according to her decision rules specified in σ. Again, with a slight abuse of
notation, define Ṽ P = πPd (w
P
a ) in states where the parent is dead. The parent’s problem
when she is alive can be written as
Ṽ P (sa, d
K
a , ε
P
a ;σ) = max
dPa ∈CP (sa,dKa ),cPa ∈(0,ŵPa (sa,dPa )]
{
πP (dKa , d
P
a , c
P
a , sa) + ε
P
a (d
P
a )
+ βE
[
Ṽ P (sa+2, d
K
a+2, ε
P
a+2;σ)
∣∣∣ sa, dKa , dPa , cPa ;σ]} (2.3.15)
where the expectation is over the parent’s wealth, health, and preference shocks of the
next period, and the child’s private preference shocks of the next period. CP (sa, dKa )
denotes the set of the parent’s feasible insurance and formal care choices in state sa when
the child’s choice is dKa . As there is no borrowing, consumption cannot be greater than
the wealth after the government transfer, ŵPa (sa, d
P
a ). I define the parent’s expected value
function as V P (sa, d
K ;σ) =
∫
Ṽ P (sa, d
K
a , ε
P
a ;σ)g(ε
P
a ). I denote the parent’s choice-specific
value function as vP (sa, d
K
a , d
P
a ;σ), and it is defined as the parent’s per-period payoff of
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choosing discrete choice dPa minus the preference shock plus her expected value function,
vP (sa, d
K
a , d
P
a ;σ) = π
P (dKa , d
P
a , σ
P,c(sa, d
K
a , d
P
a ), sa)
+ βE
[
V P (sa+2, d
K
a+2;σ)
∣∣∣sa, dKa , dPa , σP,c(sa, dKa , dPa );σ] (2.3.16)
where I replaced cPa by σ
P,c(sa, d
K
a , d
P
a ), the implied consumption contained in σ.
Definition. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σK,∗, σP,∗) is a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE)
of the model if for any (sa, ε
K
a ) ∈ S ×R|C
K |,
σK,∗(sa, ε
K
a ) = argmax
dKa ∈CK(sa)
{
vK(sa, d
K
a ;σ
∗) + εKa (d
K
a )
}
, (2.3.17)
for any (sa, d
K
a , ε
P
a ) ∈ S × CK ×R|C
P |,
σP,d,∗(sa, d
K
a , ε
P
a ) = argmax
dPa ∈CP (sa,dKa )
{
vP (sa, d
K
a , d
P
a ;σ
∗) + εPa (d
P
a )
}
, (2.3.18)
and for any (sa, d
K
a , d
P
a ) ∈ S × CK × CP ,
σP,c,∗(sa, d
K
a , d
P
a ) = argmax
cPa ∈(0,ŵPa (sa,dPa )]
{
πP (dKa , d
P
a , c
P
a , sa) (2.3.19)
+βE
[
V P (sa+2, d
K
a+2;σ
∗)
∣∣∣sa, dKa , dPa , cPa ;σ∗]}.
2.3.3 Solution Method
As the preference shocks, εKa and ε
P
a , are unobserved by the econometrician, I define a set
of conditional choice probabilities (CCP) corresponding to discrete choice rules σK and
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σP,d as
PK,σ(dKa |sa) =
∫
I
{
σK(sa, ε
K
a ) = d
K
a
}
g(εKa ) and (2.3.20)
PP,σ(dPa |sa, dKa ) =
∫
I
{
σP,d(sa, d
K
a , ε
P
a ) = d
P
a
}
g(εPa ), (2.3.21)
respectively, and define P σ := (PK,σ, PP,σ, σP,c). Compared to σ, P σ represents the
expected or ex-ante discrete choices of the child and the parent while they both specify
the parent’s consumption decision rules in the same manner. As the value functions
in Equations (2.3.17), (2.3.18), and (2.3.19) only depend on σ through P σ, rather than
solving for a MPE σ∗, I solve for P ∗ := P σ
∗
instead. I discretize the parent’s wealth into
a fine grid and use linear interpolation for wealth points not contained in the grid. As the
wealth shocks are assumed to be normally distributed, I use Gauss-Hermite quadrature
to numerically integrate over the wealth shocks. I start with the terminal period when
the parent is 100 years old and dies for sure. The terminal values for the child and the
parent are given as V K = πKd (w
P
a ) and V
P = πPd (w
P
a ), respectively. I proceed backward
in time, and for period a < 100, I apply the following steps:
(a) I obtain the parent’s optimal consumption by solving Equation (2.3.19).
(b) I obtain the parent’s optimal CCP by solving Equation (2.3.18) and integrating out
εPa . As ε
P
a is i.i.d. and follows an extreme value type I distribution with scale one,
I obtain a closed-form expression for PP,∗:
PP,∗(dPa |sa, dKa ) =
exp
(
vP (sa, d
K
a , d
P
a ;P
∗)
)∑
dPa ∈CP (sa,dKa ) exp (v
P (sa, dKa , d
P
a ;P
∗))
. (2.3.22)
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(c) I obtain the child’s optimal CCP by solving Equation (2.3.17) and integrating out
εKa . As ε
K
a is i.i.d. and follows an extreme value type I distribution with scale one,
I obtain a closed-form expression for PK,∗:
PK,∗(dKa |sa) =
exp
(
vK(sa, d
K
a ;P
∗)
)∑
dKa ∈CK(sa) exp (v
K(sa, dKa ;P
∗))
. (2.3.23)
2.3.4 Model Discussion
I close this section by discussing some of the key implications of the model. I start
with discussions on strategic interactions of the family. The child’s strategic incentive
to provide care results from the assumption that the child inherits the parent’s wealth.
As informal care and formal care are assumed to be perfect substitutes, the child has an
incentive to provide care to eliminate formal care expenses. This strategic incentive is
affected by the parent’s wealth (wPa ) and the parent’s long-term care insurance ownership
status (ltciPa ). For example, if the amounts of bequests are small or if the parent’s
formal care expenses are covered by long-term care insurance or Medicaid, then the child’s
strategic caregiving incentive is reduced. This suggests that if the parent prefers informal
care to formal care, she will have an incentive to save more and demand less long-term
care insurance to elicit more informal care. The model therefore incorporates not only
the altruistic but also the strategic bequest motives of the parent. It it worth noting that
the effects of strategic bequest motives on insurance demand and savings depend on the
parent’s relative preference for informal versus formal care. For example, if the parent
prefers formal care, then she will demand more insurance or dis-save to disincentivize the
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child’s caregiving behaviors.
I now turn to the model’s implications for selection in the long-term care insurance
market. I focus on how the willingness to pay for insurance is affected by heterogeneity
in formal care risk and heterogeneity in wealth. First, the parent’s willingness to pay for
insurance increases in formal care risk. This is straightforward as the precise role of long-
term care insurance is to offer financial protection against formal care expenses. What
is worth highlighting is that this formal care risk is not a model primitive. The parent’s
formal care risk is determined by exogenous health transitions that vary by gender and
endogenous informal care choices of the child.32 As a result, the parent’s formal care risk
is endogenously determined as an equilibrium outcome of the game played between the
parent and the child. As the model incorporates rich family demographics, the model
generates heterogeneous informal care likelihood across families. This implies that the
model allows standard adverse selection whereby individuals with a higher formal care
risk have a higher willingness to pay for insurance.
Second, the parent’s willingness to pay for insurance increases in wealth in the presence
of Medicaid. For low-wealth individuals, long-term care insurance is not an appealing
product as Medicaid already covers their formal care expenses. Brown and Finkelstein
(2008) measure “the extent to which long-term care insurance is redundant of benefits
that Medicaid would otherwise have paid” and define it as Medicaid’s implicit tax on
long-term care insurance. As the model incorporates heterogeneity in wealth, the model
predicts that high-wealth individuals who face Medicaid’s small implicit tax are more
32The parent’s health transitions also depend on the parent’s age and current health status. However,
as only healthy 60-year-olds buy insurance, there is no heterogeneity on these dimensions.
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likely to select into insurance. The model’s prediction on the nature of overall selection
is therefore ambiguous. As the parent’s willingness to pay for insurance is determined
by both heterogeneity in formal care risk and heterogeneity in wealth, it is not a priori
obvious whether individuals who have a higher willingness to pay for insurance are at
higher risk. I now turn to estimation of the model to empirically investigate the model’s
predictions.
2.4 Data and Estimation
The main data for estimation come from the HRS 1998-2010. I use single parents with
children to construct the estimation sample. To incorporate rich family heterogeneity and
maintain estimation tractability, I use two-stage conditional choice probability (CCP)
estimation (Hotz and Miller, 1993). All monetary values presented henceforth are in 2013
dollars unless otherwise stated.
2.4.1 Data
Sample selection. From the HRS 1998-2010, I restrict the sample to single respondents
aged 60 and over in 1998 who do not miss any interviews as long as they are alive. I
further restrict the sample to respondents with at least one adult child who is alive over
the sample period. The model describes the informal care decisions of one adult child.33
Therefore, I have to select one child for respondents with multiple children. I apply
the following selection rules. For respondents who ever receive help with daily activities
33While the model endogenizes the informal care choices of one child, it still incorporates the possibility
of multiple children providing care by allowing the parent’s formal care preferences to depend on the
number of children.
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from children, I pick the primary caregiving child based on the intensity of informal care
provided over the sample period.34 For respondents who do not receive any help from
any of their children, I randomly select one child. I do not select children based on
their demographics, because I am interested in identifying child demographics that are
predictive of the informal care likelihood. In the end, my sample consists of 4,183 families
and 19,292 family-year observations.
Data on parent wealth, income, and health. I measure the parent’s wealth as the
net value of total assets less debts. This measure of wealth includes real estate, housing,
vehicles, businesses, stocks, bonds, checking and savings accounts, and other assets. The
parent’s income is measured as the sum of capital income, employer pension, annuity
income, social security retirement income, and other income. As the model assumes the
parent’s income is time-invariant, for each parent in the sample, I compute the average
income over the sample period.
I use self-reported difficulties with ADLs and cognitive impairment to define health.
The survey asks about a total of five ADLs: bathing, dressing, eating, getting in/out
of bed and walking across a room. The HRS also provides cognitive scores based on
various tests that are designed to measure cognitive ability.35 I categorize a respondent
as cognitively impaired if she is in the bottom 10 percent of the cognitive score distribu-
tion. The model assumes that Medicaid and long-term care insurance cover formal care
34I sequentially use the following measures of informal care intensity until ties are broken. First, I use
the number of interviews in which the child is reported to help. Second, I use the number of total help
hours over the sample period. Third, I use the number of total help days. For the very few observations
left with ties, I randomly select one child.
35These tests include word recall, subtraction, backward number counting, object naming, date naming,
and president naming.
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expenses to eligible individuals when they have long-term care needs (hP ∈ {1, 2}). The
health-related benefit triggers used by Medicaid and most insurance companies require an
individual to have at least two ADL limitations or a severe cognitive impairment (Brown
and Finkelstein, 2007). I define the parent’s health statuses such that the model re-
flects these health-related benefit triggers. Specifically, I classify a respondent as healthy
(hPa = 0) if she is not cognitively impaired and has zero or one ADL limitation. I clas-
sify a respondent as having light long-term care needs (hPa = 1) if she is not cognitively
impaired but has two or three ADL limitations. I classify a respondent as having severe
long-term care needs (hPa = 2) if she is cognitively impaired or has four or more ADL
limitations.
Data on endogenous choices within the model. The model assumes that insurance
selection is once-and-for-all and takes place at the age of 60. To obtain data on insurance
choices, I use respondents aged 60-69 who were healthy in 1998. I do not restrict the
sample to respondents who are exactly 60 as the number of such observations is too small.
While the average purchase age is around 60, purchases happen up to 79.36 To reflect
the possibility that insurance selection may take place later in life, I use the insurance
ownership statuses over the sample period to infer insurance purchases as in Lockwood
(2016). Specifically, a respondent is treated as an insurance buyer if she reports having
a private long-term care insurance policy for almost half of the interview waves. Out of
4,183 parents in the estimation sample, 1,053 parents were aged 60-69 and healthy in
1998. Of these individuals, 14.4 percent are classified as insurance buyers.
36About 99 percent of sales are made to individuals aged 79 and less. About 20 percent of sales are
made to people aged 65-79 (Broker World, 2009-2015).
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I use children whose parents have long-term care needs to obtain data on informal
care choices.37 The HRS asks respondents the number of hours children helped in the
last month prior to the interview. A child is classified as a light caregiver if her monthly
help hours are over zero and below 100. She is classified as an intensive caregiver if the
monthly help hours are equal to or greater than 100. For children’s work choices, I use
the HRS question that asks respondents about their children’s employment. A child is
classified as working if she is reported as working full-time. A child is classified as not
working if she is reported as unemployed or working part-time.
I use parents with long-term care needs who do not receive informal care from children
to obtain data on formal care choices.38 A parent is classified as a nursing home user if
she reports having spent more than 100 nights in a nursing home in the last two years.
A parent is classified as a paid home care user if she reports having used paid home care
in the last two years.39 If a respondent reports having used paid home care and stayed
in a nursing home for more than 100 days, she is classified as a nursing home user.40
The HRS does not ask respondents about their consumption behaviors. A subsample
of the HRS respondents were selected at random and surveyed about their consumption
behaviors biennially from 2003 to 2013 in the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey
(CAMS). About 25 percent of my sample is found in the CAMS data. I use the CAMS
data to impute consumption for the remaining sample. I use information about respon-
37In my sample, almost no children provide care to parents without long-term care needs.
38For respondents who report using both informal and formal care, I apply the following rules. If
the respondent is a nursing home user, then I assume the type of long-term care used is nursing homes.
Otherwise, I assume the respondent receives informal care.
39The HRS does not ask about the intensity of paid home care utilization.
40This is rare as the question about paid home care use is largely skipped for nursing home residents.
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dents’ assets, income, age, health, and education as well as their children’s demographics
to impute consumption.
Data on child demographics. To examine possible insurance selection based on the
availability of informal care, the model incorporates rich child-level heterogeneity such
as gender, education, home ownership, residential proximity to the parent, and marital
status. The child is considered to have some college education if her completed schooling
years exceed 13. As the model assumes that the child’s home ownership, residential
proximity to the parent, and marital status are time-invariant, I use modal values of
these variables over the sample period.
Summary statistics. Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics for the parent sample.
About 80 percent of the parents are female. The mean wealth is $203,651 and the mean
annual income is $21,576. The average number of children is around three, and 40 percent
have four or more children. Among respondents who were aged 60-69 in 1998, 14 percent
purchased long-term care insurance. Almost 40 percent of the parents have long-term care
needs; 45 percent of these parents receive care from their children. Among respondents
who have long-term care needs and do not receive care from children, 37 percent use paid
home care and 26 percent use nursing homes.
Table 2.4 presents the summary statistics for the child sample. Compared to children
who never provide care over the sample period, caregiving children are more likely to be
female and live closer to parents. They are less likely to have a college education and
work full-time. Only 5 percent of the caregiving children are ever paid to help, suggesting
that direct financial compensation for family care is rare.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics on the Parent Sample
Mean Median
Female 0.79
Age 78
Have 4+ children 0.40
Wealth 203651 88000
Annual income 21576 17448
Annual consumption 37812 34473
Buy LTCI 0.14
Have LTC needs 0.37
Receive informal care 0.45
Use paid home care 0.37
Use nursing homes 0.26
Notes: Table reports mean/median values of the parent sample. Monetary
values are in 2013 dollars. Long-term care needs are defined based on ADL
limitations and cognitive impairments (see text for details). The insurance
purchase rate is among respondents who were healthy and aged 60-69 in 1998.
The informal care receipt rate is among respondents who have long-term care
needs. The formal care utilization rates are among respondents who have
long-term care needs and do not receive informal care.
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics on the Child Sample
(1) (2) (3)
All Never caregivers Caregivers
Female 0.56 0.49 0.67
Age 48 47 50
Have some college education 0.45 0.47 0.42
Married 0.66 0.68 0.64
Live within 10 mi of the parent 0.55 0.42 0.74
Homeowner 0.61 0.62 0.60
Work full-time 0.66 0.69 0.62
Ever paid to help 0.05
Observations 4183 2438 1745
Notes: Table reports mean values of the child sample. Column (1) reports summary statistics of
all children in the sample. Column (2) reports summary statistics of children who never provide
informal care over the sample period. Column (3) reports summary statistics of children who
provide some informal care over the sample period.
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Table 2.5: Parameters Estimated Outside the Model
Parameter description Notation Source Value
Shocks
Health shocks hP HRS See Table 2.6
Wealth shocks mP HRS N($10,805, $41,4842)
Choice-specific shocks εP , εK EV type 1 with scale 1
Formal care costs
Paid home care xfcP=1,hP MetLife (2008) $15,330 for h
P = 1
$30,660 for hP = 2
Nursing homes xfcP=2,hP MetLife (2008) $70,080 for h
P = 1, 2
Long-term care insurance
Max benefits b BF (2008) $49,056
Premiums p BF (2008) $3,195
Benefit period Broker World (2009-2015) Lifetime
Public programs
Medicaid thresholds w̄fcP=1 BF (2008) $9,156
w̄fcP=2 Lockwood (2016) $0
Gov. transfers (SSI) gfcP=1 $9,156
gfcP=2 $0
Child budget and time constraints
Total endowed time Ttotal 5,840 hours
Caregiving time TcgK=1 1,095 hours
TcgK=2 2,190 hours
Employment time TeK=1 2,190 hours
Family income process f(eK ; s) HRS See Appendix A.3
Other
Nursing home cons. value cnh $9,156
Parent income yP HRS $10,500, $19,000, $37,500
Discount factor β BF (2008) 10.03
Real rate of return r BF (2008) 0.03
Age difference ∆ HRS 29 years
Notes: Table reports annual values of parameters that are estimated outside the model. Monetary values are in 2013
dollars. BF (2008) refers to Brown and Finkelstein (2008).
2.4.2 Parameters Estimated Outside the Model
I now describe parameters that are estimated outside the model. These parameters are
summarized in Table 2.5. While each period within the model is two years, Table 2.5
reports annual values for easier interpretation.
Health shocks. The parent’s health transition probabilities follow a Markov process.
The next period health is determined by the parent’s gender, age, and current health.
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Table 2.6: Health Probabilities for a 60-year-old at Subsequent Ages
68 78 88 98
Male
Healthy 0.7305 0.4014 0.0966 0.0026
Light LTC needs 0.0601 0.0632 0.0320 0.0021
Severe LTC needs 0.0462 0.0746 0.0536 0.0050
Dead 0.1631 0.4608 0.8179 0.9902
Ever have LTC needs 0.6756
Female
Healthy 0.7607 0.4786 0.1304 0.0031
Light LTC needs 0.0820 0.0940 0.0575 0.0044
Severe LTC needs 0.0591 0.1044 0.1113 0.0203
Dead 0.0982 0.3230 0.7007 0.9722
Ever have LTC needs 0.8149
Notes: Table reports probabilities of different health statuses for a healthy 60-year-old (hP60 = 0)
at different subsequent ages. The health transition probabilities take the logistic functional forms
and are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.
From the HRS 1998-2010, I estimate the biennial transition probabilities by maximum
likelihood estimation using a logit that is a flexible function of health, age, and gender.
Table 2.6 reports the probabilities of different health statuses for a healthy 60-year-old
at different subsequent ages. A 60-year-old man has a 68 percent chance of ever experi-
encing long-term care needs, while a 60-year-old woman has an 81 percent chance. These
estimates are consistent with previous findings in the literature (Kemper, Komisar, and
Alecxih, 2005/2006).
Wealth shocks. Using 25 percent of the parent sample for whom I observe consumption
choices in the CAMS data, I use the wealth accumulation law of the model to compute
the sample distribution of the wealth shock. I then fit it to a normal distribution. The
estimated mean is $10,805 and the standard deviation is about four times the mean.
Formal care costs. I calibrate formal care costs based on the average formal care prices
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in 2008; the average price for a semi-private room in a nursing home was $178, and the
hourly rate for paid home care was $20 (MetLife, 2008). The mean age of the parent
sample was 85 years in 2008. As long-term care is a late-life risk, formal care prices in
2008 are likely to represent the actual costs that the majority of my sample had to pay. I
assume that the parent uses paid home care for 2 hours per day if she has light long-term
care needs and 4 hours per day if she has severe long-term care needs. I assume if the
parent enters a nursing home, she stays in the facility for the entire period.
Long-term care insurance. In the model, there is one standard long-term care in-
surance contract that provides benefits for life. During my sample period, a substantial
share of policies offered such unlimited benefit period options.41 I assume the standard
contract pays 70 percent of nursing home costs at most. This is based on the observa-
tion that most long-term care insurance policies have daily or monthly benefit caps that
are around 60-80 percent of nursing home costs (Broker World, 2009-2015). During my
sample period, policies with such benefits were sold at an average premium of $3,195 to
healthy 60-year-olds.42 In estimating the model, I assume this is the premium that the
parent pays if she has long-term care insurance.
Public programs. To receive Medicaid benefits with nursing home costs, the parent’s
assets after incurring formal care expenses and receiving any long-term care insurance
benefits must be no greater than zero. This is consistent with Medicaid’s stringent re-
41For example, in 2008, 75 percent of policies offered unlimited benefit period options (Broker World,
2009-2015).
42This is the median premium (in 2013 dollars) of policies sold to healthy 60-year-olds in 2002 that
have (1) a $100 maximum daily benefit (in 2002 dollars) that increases at the nominal annual rate of 5
percent, (2) a 0 day deductible, and (3) an unlimited benefit period (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007).
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strictions on assets for nursing home residents.43 On the other hand, to receive Medicaid
benefits with paid home care, the parent is allowed to have up to $9,156 after incurring
net formal care expenses. This is based on Medicaid’s modal income threshold for paid
home care, which was $545 per month in 1999 (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008). I assume
that the consumption value of nursing home services is also $9,156 per year. The parent
not in a nursing home receives government transfers to top up her wealth to $9,156. The
parent in a nursing home does not receive such transfers as the nursing home already
generates a consumption value of an equal amount.
Child budget and time constraints. The child is endowed with 5,840 hours per year
that she can use for work, leisure, or informal care. Light caregiving takes 1,095 hours per
year, while intensive caregiving takes 2,190 hours per year. Full-time employment also
takes 2,190 hours per year. I estimate the child’s family income process outside the model
using the HRS data. The HRS asks respondents to report their children’s family income
as one of the stated bracketed values. I use these values to estimate the child’s family
income process as a deterministic function of the child’s work choice and demographics.
Details are given in Appendix A.3.
Other values. I consider three values of the parent’s income that correspond to the
20th, 55th, and 80th percentiles of the parent income distribution of my sample. The
child is 29 years younger than the parent, which is the average age difference between
parents and children in my sample. I assume that the annual real interest rate and the
discount rate are each equal to 0.03 (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008).
43Following Lockwood (2016), I do not use small positive values as it does little in changing the results
of estimation while complicating the analysis.
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2.4.3 Estimation Strategy
The structural parameters that I estimate within the model are denoted by θ in the model
description section (Section 2.3.1).44 I now describe my strategy to estimate these param-
eters. To incorporate rich individual heterogeneity and maintain estimation tractability,
I use two-stage conditional choice probability estimation (Hotz and Miller, 1993). CCP
estimation has a computational advantage as it does not require solving the model to es-
timate the structural parameters. The first stage involves regressing the observed choices
on the observed states to obtain the empirical policy functions. The second stage uses
the empirical policy functions from the first stage to estimate value functions that are
then used to estimate the structural parameters of the model. I now provide details of
the estimation.
Empirical policy function estimation. I start by estimating the equilibrium decision
rules, P ∗ = (PK,∗, PP,∗, σP,c,∗), directly from the data. To estimate PK,∗ and PP,∗,
I use flexible logits. Specifically, to estimate PK,∗, I regress the child’s employment
and caregiving choices (dKa ) on flexible functions of common state variables (sa). To
estimate PP,∗, I regress the parent’s insurance purchase or formal care utilization choices
(dPa ) on flexible functions of sa and the child’s choice in the current period (d
K
a ). To
estimate the parent’s equilibrium consumption strategy, σP,c,∗, I regress the log of imputed
consumption from the CAMS data on flexible functions of sa, d
K
a , and d
P
a . I denote
the resulting empirical policy functions as P̂ = (P̂K , P̂P , σ̂P,c). Appendix Table A.2
compares simulated moments generated with these first-stage policy function estimates
44For the list of these parameters, see Tables 2.7 and 2.8.
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to data moments.
Value function estimation. Next, I estimate the equilibrium value functions, V K,∗
and V P,∗, using the empirical policy functions, P̂ . Following Hotz, Miller, Sanders, and
Smith (1994) and Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), I use forward simulation. For each
state, I use P̂ and the known distributions of shocks to obtain a simulated path of choices
until the parent is dead. I repeat the simulation NS = 500 times and average the child’s
and the parent’s discounted sum of flow payoffs over the NS simulated paths. I denote
the estimated value functions as V̂ K and V̂ P .
Pseudo maximum likelihood estimation. Finally, I use the estimated value functions
to construct a pseudo likelihood function and search for the parameters that maximize
this function. Intuitively, the pseudo likelihood function represents the likelihood that
the child’s and the parent’s observed choices in a given period are their “current optimal”
choices when they optimize in the current period, and starting in the next period, they
behave according to P̂ , which may not be optimal.
Before I define this pseudo likelihood function, I first define the likelihood function,
which can be obtained by fully solving the model. The data available for estimation
consist of {sant , dKant , d
P
ant ; t = 1, ..., Tn, n = 1, ..., N} where Tn is the number of interviews
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in which the nth parent-child pair is observed.45 The likelihood function is given as
L∗(θ) =
N∏
n=1
Pr(san1)
Tn−1∏
t=1
PK,∗(dKant |sant ; θ)P
P,∗(dPant |sant , d
K
ant ; θ)Pr(san,t+1 |sant , d
K
ant , d
P
ant)
(2.4.1)
where PK,∗ and PP,∗ are the optimal conditional choice probabilities obtained from solv-
ing the model backward at candidate parameter value θ. As there are no unobserved
permanent types and all shocks are serially independent, the initial conditions can be
treated as exogenous. The transition of the common state variables is deterministic ex-
cept for the parent’s wealth and health. While the parent’s health transition is exogenous
to the model, the conditional density of the parent’s wealth in the next period depends
on endogenous choices of the model. Using the wealth accumulation law in Equation
(2.3.11), the conditional density of wealth is given as
f(wPa+2|sa, dPa , cPa ) = fm
(
(1 + r)(ŵPa (sa, d
P
a )− cPa )− wPa+2
)I(wPa+2>0)
×
(
1− Fm
(
(1 + r)(ŵPa (sa, d
P
a )− cPa )
))I(wPa+2=0)
where fm and Fm are the probability and the cumulative density functions of the parent’s
wealth shock, respectively. The distribution of the wealth shock is estimated outside the
model as shown in Table 2.5. In place of cPa , I use the model’s prediction on optimal con-
sumption, σP,c,∗. Getting rid of the terms that are irrelevant in estimating the structural
45For pseudo maximum likelihood estimation, I do not use the parent’s imputed consumption based
on the CAMS data. I instead use the parent’s wealth transition to incorporate the parent’s consumption
choices.
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parameters of the model, the likelihood function can be redefined as
L∗(θ) =
N∏
n=1
Tn−1∏
t=1
PK,∗(dKant |sant ; θ)P
P,∗(dPant |sant , d
K
ant ; θ) (2.4.2)
×f
(
wPan,t+1
∣∣∣sant , dPant , σP,c,∗(sant , dKant , dPant ; θ)).
The pseudo likelihood function instead uses an approximation of P ∗ = (PK,∗, PP,∗, σP,c,∗),
thereby avoiding the need to solve the model. I repeat the steps (a)-(c) outlined in the
model solution section (Section 2.3.3), but use V̂ K and V̂ P in place of equilibrium value
functions. These steps can be summarized by the following:
(a′) I obtain the parent’s current optimal consumption by solving
ΨP,c(sa, d
K
a , d
P
a ; P̂ , θ) = argmax
cPa ∈(0,ŵPa (sa,dPa )]
{
πP (dKa , d
P
a , c
P
a , sa; θ)
+ βE
[
V̂ P (sa+2, d
K
a+2; P̂ , θ)
∣∣∣sa, dKa , dPa , cPa ; P̂]}. (2.4.3)
(b′) I obtain the parent’s current optimal discrete choice probabilities as
ΨP,d(dPa |sa, dKa ; P̂ , θ) =
exp
(
v̂P (sa, d
K
a , d
P
a ; P̂ , θ)
)
∑
dPa ∈CP (sa,dKa ) exp
(
v̂P (sa, dKa , d
P
a ; P̂ , θ)
) . (2.4.4)
(c′) I obtain the child’s current optimal discrete choice probabilities as
ΨK(dKa |sa; P̂ , θ) =
exp
(
v̂K(sa, d
K
a ; P̂ , θ)
)
∑
dKa ∈CK(sa) exp
(
v̂K(sa, dKa ; P̂ , θ)
) . (2.4.5)
For i ∈ {K,P}, v̂i is defined as in Equations (2.3.14) and (2.3.16) but P̂ and V̂ i are used
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in place of σ and V i. The function Ψ = (ΨK ,ΨP,d,ΨP,c) is called the policy iteration
operator or the policy improvement mapping as it updates the policy function estimates
(P̂ ) by embedding the agents’ optimizing behaviors of the current period (Aguirregabiria
and Mira, 2002). The pseudo likelihood function is given as
L(θ; P̂ ) =
N∏
n=1
Tn−1∏
t=1
ΨK(dKant |sant ; P̂ , θ)Ψ
P,d(dPant |sant , d
K
ant ; P̂ , θ)
× f
(
wPan,t+1
∣∣∣sant , dPant ,ΨP,c(sant , dKant , dPant ; P̂ , θ)). (2.4.6)
The CCP estimator, denoted by θ̂, maximizes this pseudo likelihood function:
θ̂ = argmax
θ∈Θ
L(θ; P̂ ). (2.4.7)
This CCP estimator is consistent if the first-stage estimator of the equilibrium policy
functions is consistent (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007). My first-stage policy function
estimator is consistent as it uses the flexible functions of the state variables. To compute
standard errors, I use bootstrapping as in Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007).
2.4.4 Identification
Before I present the estimation results, I provide heuristic arguments for identification
of the structural parameters. I first discuss identification of the parameters that govern
the child’s decisions. The child’s consumption utility (θKc ) and leisure utility (θ
K
l ) are
identified by variation in income and leisure across work and informal care choices. As
children with healthy parents do not provide informal care, their choices help identify
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consumption utility and leisure utility separately from warm-glow caregiving utility and
inheritance utility (θKd ).
46
The child’s inheritance utility is identified from her informal care choices. For strong
identification of the child’s inheritance utility, the expected inheritance should vary suffi-
ciently by informal care choices. Substantial formal care prices and the assumption that
informal care eliminates the need for formal care result in enough variations in expected
inheritances across informal care choices.
The child’s informal care choices are governed not only by inheritance utility but also
by warm-glow caregiving utility. The child’s warm-glow caregiving utility is separately
identified from inheritance utility using the informal care choices of children whose par-
ents have low wealth or are Medicaid eligible. This is because these children’s informal
care choices are mostly governed by altruism and not strategic motives. Informal care
choices of children whose parents have long-term care insurance also provide a source of
identification by the same argument. Exclusion restrictions also help separate identifica-
tion. While warm-glow caregiving utility is unaffected by the parent’s wealth, inheritance
utility crucially depends on the parent’s wealth.
I now discuss identification of the parameters that govern the parent’s decisions. The
parent’s consumption utility (θPc ) and altruistic bequest utility (θ
P
d ) are not separately
identified from savings choices. This is because savings is a continuous choice and only
the relative ratio of the consumption-bequest trade-off matters. The feature of the data
that helps identification is parents’ formal care and insurance purchase choices. Varia-
tions in consumption and expected bequests across these discrete choices allow separate
46By warm-glow caregiving utility, I refer to structural parameters that enter ωK in Equation (2.3.2).
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identification of θPc and θ
P
d .
The parent’s formal care choices identify the differences among formal care utilities
(θP
hPa ,fc
P
a ,INk≥4
). The levels of formal care utilities (θP
hPa
) are not identified from formal
care choices. As shown in Equation (2.3.5), θP
hPa
is included in the parent’s utility for all
three formal care choices (no formal care, paid home care, and nursing home). I do this
because I have already normalized the utility from receiving informal care to zero. Owing
to this normalization, the levels of formal care utilities can be interpreted as how much
the parent prefers formal care to informal care. As a result, the parent’s choices that
affect the likelihood of informal care identify these levels of formal care utilities. In other
words, the parent’s choices that are affected by her strategic bequest motives provide
a source of identification. Long-term care insurance and savings are such choices. The
parent’s insurance ownership status affects the child’s informal care incentives through
the family moral hazard effect of insurance. Savings also influence the child’s informal
care incentives by changing bequests that are at stake.
The parent’s insurance and savings choices are governed not only by strategic bequest
motives but also by altruistic bequest motives (θPd ). These two different motives are
separately identified by the following argument. The parent’s strategic bequest motives
affect the parent’s insurance and savings decisions only through the child’s caregiving
responses. Such responses are affected by the child’s demographics that determine the
cost of informal care. As the parent’s altruistic bequest motives are unrelated to the child’s
demographics, child demographics serve as exclusion restrictions that identify strategic
bequest motives from altruistic bequest motives.
Lastly, the parent’s formal care choices are governed not only by formal care utilities
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Table 2.7: Parent Structural Parameter Estimates
Description Notation Estimate S.E.
Consumption utility θPc 4.596 0.034
Bequest utility θPd 19646 1431
Formal care utility when hPa = 1
No formal care θP
hPa=1
-3.014 0.388
Paid home care, 4- children θP
hPa=1,fc
P
a=1,0
1.466 0.085
Paid home care, 4+ children θP
hPa=1,fc
P
a=1,1
1.380 0.126
Nursing home, 4- children θP
hPa=1,fc
P
a=2,0
0.575 0.177
Nursing home, 4+ children θP
hPa=1,fc
P
a=2,1
0.230 0.245
Formal care utility when hPa = 2
No formal care θP
hPa=2
-6.283 0.230
Paid home care, 4- children θP
hPa=2,fc
P
a=1,0
2.990 0.119
Paid home care, 4+ children θP
hPa=2,fc
P
a=1,1
2.368 0.104
Nursing home, 4- children θP
hPa=2,fc
P
a=2,0
4.788 0.062
Nursing home, 4+ children θP
hPa=2,fc
P
a=2,1
3.149 0.078
Notes: Table reports estimates for the parent’s structural parameters. Standard errors are
computed using 100 bootstrap samples.
but also by consumption and bequest motives. For example, the parent may not use formal
care because she would rather spend her wealth on consumption or increase bequests.
Parents with long-term care insurance or Medicaid benefits help separate identification.
This is because these parents’ formal care choices are largely unaffected by consumption
or bequest motives as they can use formal care without drawing down their wealth.
2.4.5 Estimates and Model Fit
Table 2.7 reports the estimates of the parent’s structural parameters. Several findings
emerge from the estimates. First, the parent prefers informal care to formal care. This
is shown by the fact that estimates of θP
hPa
+ θP
hPa ,fc
P
a ,INk≥4
are always negative. This is
consistent with Mommaerts (2015) who also finds that parents have a distaste for formal
care relative to informal care. Second, the parent’s relative preferences for different formal
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care services vary by health status. Parents with light long-term care needs (hPa = 1)
prefer paid home care to nursing home care.47 This is consistent with the broad perception
that most individuals want to remain in their homes and delay facility care until they
absolutely need it. Preferences for nursing home care are substantially higher when the
parent has severe long-term care needs (hPa = 2). Third, preferences for formal care are
smaller for parents with many children. This is consistent with the data pattern that
parents with four or more children use less formal care. Lastly, the parent has altruistic
bequest motives. The magnitude of altruistic bequest motives is smaller than that found
in Lockwood (2016).48 While the parent in his model only has altruistic bequest motives,
the parent in my model has both altruistic and strategic bequest motives. Because the
parent prefers informal care to formal care, strategic bequest motives induce the parent to
save more. To the extent that both models try to rationalize the same savings patterns,
my estimation of the model finds lower altruistic bequest motives as it attributes some of
the savings to strategic bequest motives.
Table 2.8 reports the estimates of the child’s structural parameters. Several findings
emerge from the estimates. First, children providing care to parents with light long-
term care needs derive higher caregiving utility than those providing care to parents with
severe long-term care needs. This implies that taking care of parents with severe daily
living limitations is stressful to children. This is consistent with Skira (2015), who also
finds higher caregiving utility when the parent has modest rather than severe long-term
47The estimates of nursing home preferences are net of consumption value from nursing home care
(cnh) as I have explicitly included it in the parent’s consumption utility. See Equation (2.3.4).
48He considers a life-cycle model of a single parent who makes long-term care insurance and savings
decisions, abstracting away from strategic interactions with the family.
61
Table 2.8: Child Structural Parameter Estimates
Description Notation Estimate S.E.
Consumption utility θKc 1.137 0.027
Leisure utility θKl 0.688 0.032
Inheritance utility θKd 5.077 0.195
Warm-glow caregiving utility
hPa = 1, light informal care θ
K
hPa=1,cg
K
a =1
1.141 0.048
hPa = 1, intensive informal care θ
K
hPa=1,cg
K
a =2
0.711 0.053
hPa = 2, light informal care θ
K
hPa=2,cg
K
a =1
-0.208 0.052
hPa = 2, intensive informal care θ
K
hPa=2,cg
K
a =2
0.563 0.035
Male θKmale -1.019 0.043
Live far θKfar -1.148 0.046
Initiate caregiving θKstart -0.987 0.046
Notes: Table reports estimates for the child’s structural parameters. Standard errors are computed
using 100 bootstrap samples.
care needs. Second, the psychological burden of providing care varies substantially by
child demographics. Sons find caregiving more burdensome than daughters, and children
who do not live within 10 miles of their parents experience higher caregiving costs than
children who do. Third, there is a substantial cost in initiating informal care. This may
reflect switching or adjustment costs. The model generates persistence in informal care,
consistent with Skira (2015). Lastly, the child values bequests. The model therefore
generates family moral hazard whereby children reduce informal care in response to their
parents’ insurance coverage.
I now discuss the model fit. Figure 2.5 shows that the model does a good job of
matching the empirical long-term care insurance coverage rate by wealth quintile. In
particular, the model is able to replicate the monotonically increasing ownership rate in
wealth. Figure 2.6 reports the actual and simulated parent median wealth by age, and
the fit is reasonable. Table 2.9 shows that the model is able to match the paid home
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care and nursing home utilization rates as well as the light and intensive informal care
rates, conditional on the intensity of the parent’s long-term care needs. Figure 2.7 further
breaks down the formal care moments by parent wealth. The model is able to replicate
the fact that the paid home care utilization rate increases in wealth, and parents in the
bottom wealth quintile have the highest nursing home utilization rate.
Figure 2.8 reports the actual and simulated formal care utilization rates by whether
or not parents have four or more children. In the data, the paid home care utilization rate
is almost the same between parents with few children and parents with many children.
On the other hand, the nursing home utilization rate for parents with many children is
lower by 30 percent compared to that for parents with few children. Figure 2.8 shows
that the model is able to rationalize these patterns.
Figure 2.9 reports the informal care rate by parent wealth. The model is able to
reproduce the inverted-U pattern across wealth, although the pattern is slightly shifted
to the right compared to the data pattern. Figures 2.10 and 2.11 report informal care
and employment moments by child gender and residential proximity to the parent, re-
spectively. The fit of these moments confirm that the model is capable of matching the
child’s empirical moments conditional on various demographics. Table 2.10 reports the
fit of informal care transition probabilities. The model is able to reproduce the persistent
caregiving pattern in the data.
Finally, Table 2.11 compares the simulated lifetime formal care expenses for a healthy
65-year-old to those found in Kemper, Komisar, and Alecxih (2005/2006). Similar to
their findings, the model predicts large formal care risks; half of 65-year-olds will not
incur any formal care expenses while the other half will spend on average $100,146 on
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Figure 2.5: Long-Term Care Insurance Coverage by Parent Wealth
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Notes: Figure reports data and simulated long-term care insurance coverage rates by parent wealth.
Simulated moments are generated using the estimated model.
formal care. The model predicts that almost 40 percent of these expenses will be paid by
Medicaid, which is also similar to what the other study finds.
2.5 Equilibrium Analyses
I use the estimated model to conduct equilibrium analyses of the long-term care insur-
ance market. To do this, I augment the model by incorporating competitive insurance
companies. I use the augmented framework to examine how private information about
informal care and family moral hazard affect the equilibrium outcomes, and to shed light
on the recent soaring premiums.
One standardized policy is offered in the competitive long-term care insurance market.
Risk-neutral insurance companies compete by setting premiums. The standard policy is
sold to healthy 60-year-olds at a constant premium and has benefit features that are
described in Section 2.3.1: (1) it has a maximal per-period benefit cap, (2) it provides
benefits for life, and (3) premium payments are waived while policyholders are receiving
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Figure 2.6: Parent Wealth by Age
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Notes: Figure reports data and simulated median wealth by parent age. Simulated moments are generated
using the estimated model.
Table 2.9: Long-Term Care Utilization
Data Model
Among parents w/ light LTC needs
Light informal care rate 0.37 0.35
Intensive informal care rate 0.18 0.10
Paid home care rate 0.50 0.46
Nursing home rate 0.07 0.04
Among parents w/ severe LTC needs
Light informal care rate 0.09 0.10
Intensive informal care rate 0.29 0.23
Paid home care rate 0.30 0.27
Nursing home rate 0.36 0.33
Notes: Table reports data and simulated moments. Simulated moments are
generated using the estimated model. Formal care rates are among parents
who have specified health statuses and do not receive informal care from chil-
dren.
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Figure 2.7: Formal Care by Parent Wealth
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Notes: Figure reports data and simulated paid home care and nursing home utilization rates among
parents who have long-term care needs and do not receive any informal care. Simulated moments are
generated using the estimated model.
Figure 2.8: Formal Care by Number of Children
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Notes: Figure reports data and simulated paid home care and nursing home utilization rates among
parents who have long-term care needs and do not receive any informal care. Simulated moments are
generated using the estimated model.
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Figure 2.9: Informal Care by Parent Wealth
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Notes: Figure reports data and simulated informal care rates. Informal care rates are computed among
parents with long-term care needs. Simulated moments are generated using the estimated model.
Figure 2.10: Informal Care and Employment by Child Gender
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Notes: Figure reports data and simulated employment and informal care rates of children. Informal care
rates are computed among parents with long-term care needs. Simulated moments are generated using
the estimated model.
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Figure 2.11: Informal Care and Employment by Child Residential Proximity
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Notes: Figure reports data and simulated employment and informal care rates of children. Informal care
rates are computed among parents with long-term care needs. Simulated moments are generated using
the estimated model.
Table 2.10: Informal Care Transitions
No informal care Informal care
No informal care 90% 10%
[ 92%] [ 8%]
Informal care 40% 60%
[ 46%] [ 54%]
Notes: Table reports data and simulated informal care transitions. Simulated transi-
tions are generated using the estimated model and are given in brackets. Informal care
transitions are computed using children whose parents are alive for two consecutive
periods.
Table 2.11: Present-Discounted Value of Lifetime Formal Care Expenses for a 65-year-old
Literature Model
Mean expenses $55,930 $50,073
Mean expenses cond’l on ever using formal care $96,431 $100,146
% of 65-year-olds ever using formal care 58% 50%
% of expenses paid by Medicaid 37% 36%
Notes: Table reports the model-simulated present-discounted value of lifetime formal care expenses for
a healthy 65-year-old and that found in Kemper, Komisar, and Alecxih (2005/2006). The values are
on a unisex basis. Monetary values are inflated to 2013 dollars.
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benefits. The maximal annual benefit is 70 percent of the annual nursing home costs.
Formal care costs grow at the annual real growth rate of 2 percent (Genworth, 2015).
The annual benefit also increases at the same rate such that the policy always pays 70
percent of the nursing home costs at most. I analyze the equilibrium outcomes of this
policy for my sample period. Specifically, I examine the equilibrium outcomes when the
policy is sold to healthy 60-year-olds in 2002. In 2002, premiums varied only by age and
three or four underwriting classes determined by health conditions at the time of initial
purchase. Under this pricing rule, all healthy 60-year-olds pay the same premium.
The equilibrium price of the standard policy, p∗, is determined by the zero profit con-
dition, which requires that insurance companies break even on average. p∗ is characterized
as the lowest break-even price:
p∗ = min{p : AR(p) = AC(p)}. (2.5.1)
AR(p) is the average revenue curve and is defined as the average of the present-discounted
value of the lifetime premium payments of individuals who select into insurance at pre-
mium p. AC(p) is the average cost curve and is defined as the average of the present-
discounted value of the lifetime claims of individuals who select into insurance at premium
p. Henceforth, I will refer to AR(p) as the average revenue curve, and AC(p) as the av-
erage cost curve.
I build the simulation sample by selecting healthy 60- and 61-year-olds from the HRS
2002. I match one adult child to each parent using the selection criteria described earlier
in Section 2.4.1. The simulation sample includes both single and married individuals. I do
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Table 2.12: Summary Statistics on the Simulation Sample
Mean Median
Parents
Married 0.75
Female 0.57
Wealth 393788 194973
Have 4+ children 0.45
Children
Female 0.48
Age 35
College education 0.50
Married 0.57
Live within 10 mi of the parent 0.48
Homeowner 0.45
Observations 1982
Notes: Table reports the mean and the median values of the simulation
sample. Monetary values are in 2013 dollars. Parents in the simulation
sample are healthy 60- and 61-year-olds in the HRS 2002.
not restrict the sample to single individuals because in 2002, all healthy 60-year-olds paid
the same premium regardless of their marital status.49 Table 2.12 presents the summary
statistics of the simulation sample. It consists of 1,982 parent-child pairs. Three quarters
of the parents are married and 57 percent are women. The average wealth is around
$400,000 and the median is around $200,000. Of the children, 48 percent are female, one
half have a college education, and 48 percent live within 10 miles of their parents. I make
200 duplicates for each parent-child pair.
For each candidate equilibrium premium p, I solve the model backward using the
estimated structural parameters. Then, I use the equilibrium policy functions to forward
simulate choices of families in the simulation sample. Using parents who select into
insurance, I obtain the average cost curve AC(p) and the average revenue curve AR(p).
49As the model is estimated using single individuals, the estimated model may overpredict informal
care from children for married individuals. However, this issue is mitigated by the fact that (1) long-term
care needs are late-life risks and (2) the share of singles increases sharply with age.
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I look for the premium where the average cost equals the average revenue. I now present
main findings of this paper.
2.5.1 Equilibrium Effects of Informal Care
I conduct various counterfactuals to examine how informal care affects the equilibrium
outcomes in the long-term care insurance market. First, I show that private information
about informal care results in substantial adverse selection. To reduce market ineffi-
ciencies created by adverse selection, I consider counterfactual pricing rules that reduce
private information about family care, and examine their coverage and welfare effects.
Next, I demonstrate that some parents forgo insurance as insurance undermines the ef-
fectiveness of bequests in eliciting informal care. Finally, I show how the existence of
informal care limits the size of the long-term care insurance market.
Adverse Selection on Informal Care
The left panel of Figure 2.12 reports the simulated average cost curve in premium. The
increasing average cost curve in premium shows that individuals who have a higher will-
ingness to pay for insurance are indeed more expensive to insurance companies.50 This
finding serves as direct evidence of adverse selection in the long-term care insurance mar-
ket.51 As shown in Appendix Figure A.4, while there is a quantitatively meaningful
selection on wealth (the demand for insurance sharply increases in wealth), there is no
50The fact that I do not allow for heterogeneity in risk aversion may overpredict the magnitude of
adverse selection. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) find a negative correlation between risk aversion and
risk in the long-term care insurance market that mitigates adverse selection based on risk.
51Several studies use a cost curve increasing in price as the definition of the adverse selection property
in insurance markets (Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen, 2010; Einav and Finkelstein, 2011; Handel, Hendel,
and Whinston, 2015).
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Figure 2.12: Adverse Selection Property
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Notes: Left panel reports AC(p), the average cost curve in premium. AC(p) is defined as the average of
the present-discounted value of the lifetime claims of individuals who select into insurance at premium
p. Right panel reports the coverage rate in premium. Appendix Figure A.2 reports the average cost
curve and the average revenue curve together in premium. The equilibrium premium for the standard
policy is $5,732 and the equilibrium coverage rate is 6.1 percent. The standard policy is sold to healthy
60-year-olds and provides benefits for life (see main text for details).
meaningful relationship between wealth and formal care risk. As a result, adverse selec-
tion based on formal care risk largely determines the overall nature of selection in the
long-term care insurance market. The right panel of Figure 2.12 reports the coverage rate
in premium. Appendix Figure A.2 reports the average cost curve and the average rev-
enue curve together in premium. The equilibrium premium is $5,732 and the equilibrium
coverage rate is 6.1 percent.
I now quantify how private information about informal care accounts for the detected
adverse selection. As emphasized earlier, heterogeneity in formal care risk is driven by
heterogeneity in health transition probabilities (which vary by gender) and heterogeneity
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Figure 2.13: Informal Care and Insurance Selection
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Notes: Left panel reports the fraction of parents who buy long-term care insurance at the equilibrium
premium, by each decile of the informal care measure. Right panel reports the average present-discounted
value of the lifetime formal care expenses when the parent owns long-term care insurance. The informal
care measure is defined as the number of informal care periods divided by the number of bad health
periods when there is no private long-term care insurance. Quantiles start at the 40th percentile because
there is a big mass at zero (about 55 percent of parents never receive informal care). This is consistent
with the data patterns; Table 2.3 shows that among parents with long-term care needs, 55 percent do not
receive any informal care from children.
in family care. To quantify how heterogeneity in informal care provided by the primary
caregiving child contributes to adverse selection, in the left panel of Figure 2.13, for
each decile of “informal care measure,” I report the fraction of parents who select into
insurance at the equilibrium premium. For each family in the simulation sample, I define
this informal care measure as the number of total informal care periods divided by the
number of total bad health periods when there is no private long-term care insurance (see
Appendix Figure A.3 for the density of this informal care measure). The negative slope
shows that parents who expect less informal care under no insurance are more likely to
select into insurance at the equilibrium premium. Quantitatively, moving from the 10th
percentile to the 90th percentile of the informal care distribution is associated with a
73
4-percentage-point decrease in the demand for insurance. Given the equilibrium coverage
rate of 6.1 percent, the finding suggests that there is substantial selection on informal
care. To quantify how adverse this selection is, the right panel of Figure 2.13 reports, for
each decile of the informal care measure, the average present-discounted value of lifetime
formal care expenses when the parent has long-term care insurance. Qualitatively, the
slope is negative as expected. Quantitatively, moving from the 10th percentile to the
90th percentile of the informal care measure is associated with an $81,000 reduction in
lifetime spending on formal care. Together, the results in Figure 2.13 show that private
information about informal care is a substantial source of adverse selection.
The empirical finding that there is substantial adverse selection based on the avail-
ability of informal care provides a new explanation for the small size of the long-term care
insurance market. Private information about informal care hinders the efficient workings
of the insurance market where, in equilibrium, the market only serves high-risk individuals
with limited access to informal care. Low-risk individuals who nevertheless value finan-
cial protection against formal care expenses forgo insurance owing to adverse selection.
This finding suggests that policies that are intended to reduce the amounts of private
information about informal care may increase the market size and generate welfare gains.
I now examine the equilibrium and welfare effects of such policies.
Equilibrium Effects of Pricing on Child Demographics
To explore practical policies that could reduce adverse selection in the long-term care
insurance market, I consider counterfactual pricing rules where prices are conditional
on observables that predict formal care risk. In addition to gender-based pricing that
74
was adopted by insurance companies in 2013, I consider pricing on child demographics.
The estimation results in Table 2.8 show that the primary caregiving child’s gender and
residential proximity substantially affect her informal care incentives.52 Furthermore, the
estimation results in Table 2.7 reveal that parents with more children are less likely to use
formal care. Based on these findings, I consider a counterfactual risk adjustment where
prices are conditional on the primary caregiving child’s gender and residential proximity,
and whether or not an individual has at least four children. Depending on the number of
values that priced demographics can take, the market results in multiple market segments.
For example, under gender-based pricing, there are two market segments: one for women
and one for men. Under child demographic-based pricing, there are eight market segments.
For each market segment of each pricing rule, I find the break-even premium that satisfies
Equation (2.5.1).
Table 2.13 compares the equilibrium outcomes of default pricing (first row), gender-
based pricing (second row), child demographic-based pricing (third row), and hybrid
pricing on gender and child demographics (fourth row). For each pricing rule, I examine
the welfare effects by computing the one-time wealth transfer needed to make a parent
under default pricing indifferent to counterfactual pricing.
By price discriminating women from men, gender-based pricing reduces private in-
formation about formal care risk (see Table 2.14 for the equilibrium outcomes of each
market segment). The ownership rate increases by 18 percent, and the average cost of
the insured drops by 14 percent. Table 2.14 shows that these effects are generated by
52As shown in Table A.1, the child’s gender is also an important factor in labor market income, which
determines her opportunity cost of providing care.
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Table 2.13: Equilibrium and Welfare Effects of Counterfactual Pricing
Pricing rule Average Ownership AC Medicaid Welfare
premium spending
Default 5732 0.061 76381 21669 0
Gender 5761 0.072 65927 21658 375
Child demographics 4835 0.095 58890 21311 1002
Gender & child demographics 4813 0.102 54300 21416 1255
Notes: Table reports equilibrium outcomes of the standard policy under various pricing rules. The stan-
dard policy is sold to healthy 60-year-olds and provides benefits for life (see main text for details). First
row reports the equilibrium outcomes under default pricing where all healthy 60-year-olds pay the same
price. Second row reports the equilibrium outcomes when prices are conditional on the gender of a con-
sumer. Third row reports the equilibrium outcomes when prices are conditional on the primary caregiving
child’s gender and residential proximity, and whether or not a consumer has at least four children. Fourth
row reports the equilibrium outcomes when prices are conditional on the gender of a consumer, and the
three variables used for child demographic-based pricing. Except for the first row where there is one mar-
ket segment, Average premium represents the average of the equilibrium premiums of multiple market
segments. Ownership represents the share of the simulation sample that buys insurance. AC represents
the average present-discounted value of the lifetime claims of the insured. Medicaid spending represents
the average present-discounted value of lifetime Medicaid expenditures per individual. Welfare represents
the average wealth transfer needed to make a parent under default pricing indifferent to counterfactual
pricing.
more men selecting into insurance as they are no longer pooled with women who have a
higher risk of using formal care. Gender-based pricing generates welfare gains for men
who face a lower equilibrium premium, but it generates welfare losses for women who
face a higher equilibrium premium. Overall, there is an average welfare gain of $375 per
individual.
Pricing on child demographics substantially reduces private information about formal
Table 2.14: Equilibria under Gender-Based Pricing
Gender Premium Ownership AC
Male 4548 0.13 57525
Female 6974 0.03 96272
Notes: Table reports equilibrium outcomes of each market segment
under gender-based pricing. AC represents the average present-
discounted value of the lifetime claims of individuals who buy insurance
in each market segment.
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Table 2.15: Equilibria under Child Demographic-Based Pricing
(Daughter, Live close, 4+ Children) Premium Ownership AC
Yes Yes Yes 2412 0.154 33797
Yes No Yes 5072 0.067 67397
No Yes Yes 4897 0.064 65738
No No Yes 5907 0.067 77972
Yes Yes No 2539 0.182 36007
Yes No No 5693 0.066 75891
No Yes No 5441 0.064 72524
No No No 6722 0.096 88100
Notes: Table reports equilibrium outcomes of each market segment under counterfactual pricing on child
demographics. Priced child demographics are the primary caregiving child’s gender (Daughter) and resi-
dential proximity (Live close), and whether or not a consumer has at least 4 children (4+ Children). AC
represents the average present-discounted value of the lifetime claims of individuals who buy insurance in
each market segment.
care risk (see Table 2.15 for the equilibrium outcomes of each market segment). Compared
to default pricing, the equilibrium coverage rate increases by 56 percent, the average
premium decreases by 16 percent, and the average cost of the insured decreases by 23
percent. Table 2.15 shows that these effects are generated by increased coverage rates
among parents with family demographics that indicate high availability of informal care.
Increases in the coverage rates relieve Medicaid’s burden of paying formal care expenses,
and the average lifetime Medicaid spending per individual falls by $358. Pricing on child
demographics results in an average welfare gain of $1,002 per individual.
Finally, hybrid pricing on gender and child demographics generates the biggest in-
crease in the coverage rate and produces the largest welfare gain. These findings suggest
that complementing current gender-based pricing with child demographic-based pricing
can substantially reduce adverse selection, invigorate the market, and create welfare gains
to the elderly.
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Figure 2.14: Family Moral Hazard by Parent Wealth
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Notes: Figure reports for each parent wealth decile, the average reduction in total informal care periods as
parents move from the No LTCI Regime to the Mandatory LTCI Regime (wealth is measured at parent age
60). Under the No LTCI regime, (1) children on average provide informal care for 0.67 period over parents’
lifetime (a period is 2 years), and (2) conditional on ever providing informal care, they provide informal
care for 1.95 periods. Under the Mandatory LTCI regime, (1) children on average provide informal care
for 0.56 period over parents’ lifetime, and (2) conditional on ever providing informal care, they provide
informal care for 1.87 periods.
Family Moral Hazard and Strategic Non-Purchase of Insurance
The results so far show that private information about family care limits the size of
the long-term care insurance market by creating adverse selection. Estimates of the
structural parameters reveal another mechanism by which informal care can account for
the small size of the market: children value inheritance and parents prefer informal care
to formal care. As a result, the strategic non-purchase of long-term care insurance as
argued in several theoretical papers may be a potential explanation for the small size of
the insurance market.
I first quantify the magnitude of family moral hazard. To do this, I examine how in-
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formal care choices change as I move parents from having no insurance (No LTCI Regime)
to having insurance (Mandatory LTCI Regime).53 For each parent-child pair, I measure
the magnitude of family moral hazard by computing the reduction in total informal care
periods over the parent’s lifetime. I find that children on average reduce informal care
periods by almost 20 percent in response to their parents’ insurance coverage. Figure 2.14
reports the reduction in total informal care periods by parent wealth. The magnitude of
family moral hazard is substantially smaller for low-wealth parents than for high-wealth
parents. Children with low-wealth parents have weak strategic incentives to provide care
as the bequests they can protect by providing informal care are small. On the other
hand, children with high-wealth parents reduce informal care by greater magnitudes as
their sizable bequests are now protected by long-term care insurance.
I quantify how this family moral hazard affects the size of the long-term care insurance
market. To this end, I conduct a counterfactual exercise with no family moral hazard.
I remove family moral hazard by forcing the child whose parent owns long-term care
insurance to make the same informal care choices as she would when the parent did
not own insurance. In this counterfactual scenario, the parent no longer worries about
insurance undermining the effectiveness of bequests in eliciting informal care.
The results of this counterfactual are summarized in Table 2.16. The first row shows
the equilibrium of the benchmark model where children are allowed to show behavioral
responses to parents’ insurance coverage. The second row shows the partial equilibrium
when there is no family moral hazard but the premium is held constant at the benchmark
53For the rest of the section, the standard policy uses default pricing where all healthy 60-year-olds
pay the same premium.
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Table 2.16: Equilibrium without Family Moral Hazard
Ownership Premium AC
Benchmark equilibrium 0.061 5732 76381
Partial equilibrium without FMH 0.067 5732 71382
Equilibrium without FMH 0.086 5286 70765
Notes: Table reports the equilibrium coverage rate, equilibrium premium, and average present-discounted
value of the lifetime claims under each of the specified equilibrium scenarios. First row reports the
equilibrium outcomes of the benchmark model where children can respond to parents’ insurance coverage.
Second row reports the partial equilibrium outcomes when there is no family moral hazard and the
premium is held constant at the benchmark equilibrium premium. Third row reports the new equilibrium
outcomes when there is no family moral hazard. Under no family moral hazard scenario, children whose
parents own long-term care insurance are forced to make the same informal care choices as they would
when their parents did not own insurance.
equilibrium of $5,732. Without family moral hazard, the demand increases by 10 percent.
There is a noticeable reduction in the average risk of the insured population. This is
because children provide the same amount of informal care despite the fact that their
parents are insured. As a result, the insured parents are less likely to use formal care
compared to the benchmark model where insurance undermines children’s informal care
incentives. Finally, the third row reports the competitive equilibrium without family
moral hazard. As the risk of the insured population decreases, the equilibrium premium
falls to $5,286 and the coverage rate increases by 41 percent. Figure A.5 in the Appendix
graphically summarizes the results.
These findings suggest that family moral hazard reduces parents’ willingness to pay
for insurance as they prefer informal care over formal care. Family moral hazard further
reduces the equilibrium coverage rate by increasing the formal care risk of insured parents
and increasing the equilibrium premium. The overall equilibrium effect of family moral
hazard is substantial, which highlights the value of estimating a game model of family
long-term care decisions.
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Table 2.17: Equilibrium without Informal Care
Ownership Premium AC
Benchmark equilibrium 0.061 5732 76381
Partial equilibrium without informal care 0.150 5732 87129
Equilibrium without informal care 0.095 6741 88071
Notes: Table reports the equilibrium coverage rate, equilibrium premium, and average present-discounted
value of the lifetime claims under each of the specified equilibrium scenarios. First row reports the
equilibrium outcomes of the benchmark model where children can provide informal care. Second row
reports the partial equilibrium outcomes when children cannot provide informal care and the premium is
held constant at the benchmark equilibrium premium. Third row reports the new equilibrium outcomes
when children cannot provide care.
Existence of Informal Care and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market
I now examine how the existence of informal care affects the equilibrium of the long-
term care insurance market. To do this, I compute the equilibrium of the long-term
care insurance market when there is no informal care. In this counterfactual experiment,
children’s caregiving choices are always set to no informal care. Table 2.17 summarizes
the results. The first row shows the benchmark equilibrium outcomes. The second row
shows the partial equilibrium without informal care when the premium is held constant
at the benchmark equilibrium. The results in this row can be interpreted as the effects
of informal care on the demand for insurance. Taking away the option of informal care
sharply increases the demand by 9 percentage points. However, the formal care risk of the
entire population (not just the insured population) increases, because without informal
care, formal care becomes the only way to receive long-term care. The third row shows
the competitive equilibrium when there is no informal care. The equilibrium premium
increases to reflect the increased risk in the absence of informal care. The overall increase
in the equilibrium coverage rate is 3.4 percentage points. Figure A.6 in the Appendix
81
graphically reports the results in Table 2.17.
These results suggest that while the existence of informal care substantially reduces
the demand for insurance, its effect on reducing the equilibrium coverage rate is much
smaller. This is because informal care reduces the overall formal care risk of the elderly
thereby lowering the equilibrium premium. Combined with the results in Table 2.13, the
most salient impact of informal care on limiting the size of the long-term care insurance
market does not arise from its existence alone. The failure to account for heterogeneity
in informal care creates market inefficiencies that have as powerful an effect on limiting
the size of the market.
2.5.2 Explanations for Soaring Premiums
As a final set of counterfactuals, I use the equilibrium model of the insurance market to
shed light on the recent soaring premiums. I show that the failure to account for selection
and moral hazard led to substantial underpricing. I also demonstrate that the decreasing
availability of informal care for baby boomers results in a higher formal care risk and puts
upward pressure on the equilibrium premium.
Underpricing
The average empirical premium of the standard policy considered throughout this section
was $3,195 in 2002.54 The model predicts that the zero-profit premium for this policy is
54This is the median premium (in 2013 dollars) of policies sold to healthy 60-year-olds in 2002 that have
(1) a $100 maximum daily benefit (in 2002 dollars) that increases at the nominal annual rate of 5 percent,
(2) a 0 day deductible, and (3) an unlimited benefit period (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007). The average
nursing home cost in 2002 was around $143, implying that these policies cover 70 percent of nursing home
costs at most, as assumed for the standard policy. Using the annual inflation of 3 percent, the maximum
benefits of these policies grow at the real annual rate of 2 percent, as assumed for the standard policy.
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$5,732. This finding suggests that long-term care insurance products were indeed initially
underpriced, and were below the break-even level by almost 80 percent. This number co-
incides with Genworth’s requested premium increases of 80-85 percent on existing policies
(Carrns, 2015).
I now provide potential explanations for such substantial underpricing. The initial
actuarial model, which was widely used by long-term care insurance companies to price
their products predicts formal care risks unconditional on ownership status of long-term
care insurance.55 This may be due to the underestimated adverse selection/moral hazard
or a lack of sufficient claims data. While individuals typically buy long-term care insurance
in their sixties, most of them do not use it until they turn 80.56 Such a time lag between
the purchase and the use of insurance suggests that it takes almost two decades for
insurance companies to learn about the risk of their policyholders. As modern long-term
care insurance products were introduced in the late 1980s, it has only been a few years
since insurance companies have had access to sufficient claims data.
To examine how the failure to account for adverse selection and moral hazard affects
pricing, I compute the premium where the average formal care expenses of the entire
population equals the average premium payment. Figure 2.15 presents this exercise. The
black solid line and the black dashed line represent the correct average cost curve and
average revenue curve, respectively. The red solid line - denoted as the wrong average
cost curve - represents the average counterfactual claim of the entire population. This is
55See Brown and Finkelstein (2007) for more details about the widespread use of this actuarial model.
For more details about the actuarial model itself, see Robinson (1996, 2002).
56Figure 2.1 shows that long-term care is a late-life risk. Also, the average age at first entry into a
nursing home is around 83 years (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007).
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Figure 2.15: Underpricing
Annual premium
2991 5732
×104
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Notes: Black solid line and black dashed line represent the average cost curve and the average revenue
curve, respectively. Red solid line represents the average counterfactual claim of the entire population.
This is computed by averaging over the smaller of formal care expenses and insurance benefits regardless
of insurance holdings. Red dashed line represents the average counterfactual premium payment of the
entire population. This is computed by assuming that everyone pays the premium when they are healthy.
computed by averaging over the smaller of formal care expenses and insurance benefits
regardless of insurance holdings. This curve lies substantially below the correct average
cost curve as there is adverse selection and moral hazard in the market.57 The red dashed
line - denoted as the wrong average revenue curve - represents the average counterfactual
premium payment of the entire population, which is computed by assuming that everyone
pays premiums when they are healthy. The wrong average cost curve and the wrong
57The wrong average cost curve is decreasing in premium because as the premium increases, the
coverage rate falls, and the wrong average cost is mostly determined by the formal care risk of the
uninsured population who are low risk.
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average revenue curve intersect when the premium is $2,991. This is extremely close to
the average premium of $3,195 in 2002. This finding suggests that the actuarial model
that does not distinguish between the formal care risk of individuals who select into
insurance and the formal care risk of individuals who do not substantially underpredicts
the break-even premium.
Demographic Changes
The results shown above suggest that a large fraction of recent premium increases are
attributable to initial underpricing. I provide another plausible explanation for the pre-
mium increases happening around 2010. I draw from the fact that baby boomers, who
were born between 1946 and 1964, became major consumers of the long-term care in-
surance market around that time. Compared to their former cohort (called the silent
generation), baby boomers are at higher risk of using formal care as they have fewer
children. Figure 2.16 shows that the average number of children among 60-year-olds is
monotonically decreasing over time. This suggests that demographic changes may put
upward pressure on the equilibrium premium.
To quantify this effect, I analyze how the equilibrium premium changes as the baby
boom generation replaces the silent generation as major consumers of the insurance mar-
ket. The simulation sample used throughout this section consists of 60-year-olds from
the HRS 2002 who represent the silent generation. I construct a new simulation sample
that represents the baby boom generation by selecting 60-year-olds from the HRS 2010.
Figure 2.17 compares the equilibrium premium for the baby boom generation to that
for the silent generation. The average cost curve of baby boomers lies above that of the
85
Figure 2.16: Decreasing Number of Children
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Notes: Figure reports the average number of children among 60-year-olds from HRS 1998-2010.
silent generation, implying overall increases in formal care risk for baby boomers. The
equilibrium premium for baby boomers is almost 10 percent higher than the equilibrium
premium for the silent generation, and the equilibrium coverage rate falls from 6.1 percent
to 4.8 percent.
This finding suggests that insurance companies may be increasing premiums in part
because they expect overall increases in formal care risk due to the decreasing availability
of informal care. While it is true that insurance companies are still not explicitly pricing on
child demographics, that does not imply that they are unaware of the effects of informal
care on formal care risk.58 The results in Figure 2.17 show that without changes in
pricing strategies, such as adopting the new risk adjustments suggested in Table 2.13, one
58The absence of child demographic-based pricing should not be interpreted as evidence that this pricing
is harmful to insurance companies. For example, gender-based pricing only started in 2013, despite the
well-known fact that women are at higher risk compared to men.
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Figure 2.17: Demographic Changes and Equilibrium Premium Increases
Annual premium
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Notes: Black solid line and black dashed line represent the average cost curve and the average revenue
curve, respectively, when the policy is sold to the silent generation. The equilibrium coverage rate is 6.1
percent. Red solid line and red dashed line represent the average cost curve and the average revenue
curve, respectively, when the policy is sold to the baby boom generation. The equilibrium coverage rate
is 4.8 percent.
can expect premium increases in the long-term care insurance market for the foreseeable
future.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper provides new empirical explanations for why the long-term care insurance mar-
ket has not been growing. I develop and structurally estimate a dynamic non-cooperative
model of the family in which parents and children interact with altruistic and strategic
motives. Counterfactual competitive equilibrium analyses of the market reveal two main
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mechanisms by which informal care limits the size of the long-term care insurance market.
First, the current pricing practices of insurance companies leave consumers with private
information about informal care. I show that there is substantial adverse selection based
on this dimension of private information. Second, insurance has unintended consequences
of discouraging family care by protecting bequests from formal care expenses on behalf
of the family. This family moral hazard effect of insurance limits the market size by
reducing the value of insurance and increasing the formal care risk of the insured. I
demonstrate that the initial neglect of adverse selection and family moral hazard resulted
in substantial underpricing. I further show that the decreasing availability of informal
care for more recent birth cohorts puts upward pressure on the equilibrium premium.
I propose child demographic-based pricing as an alternative risk adjustment that could
decrease the average premium, invigorate the market, and create welfare gains.
Challenges in the long-term care sector, such as the aging of the baby boom generation,
increasing burdens of informal caregivers, and growing Medicaid spending on formal care,
have triggered various policy recommendations. They include the government providing
family care subsidies and insurance companies paying cash to informal caregivers. Such
recommendations are non-market-based which could lead to even bigger efficiency costs,
or involve drastic changes in the structure of the insurance products and raise doubts
about the practicality. In contrast, my proposal of using family demographics in pricing
is market-based and is already in momentum; the fact that insurance companies have
started to price on consumer characteristics makes my proposal well-grounded.
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Chapter 3
Partial Rating Area Offering in
the ACA Marketplaces
This chapter is co-authored with Hanming Fang.
3.1 Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) aims at providing af-
fordable health insurance plans through the creation of state-level health insurance mar-
ketplaces. The ACA regulates factors based on which insurers set their premiums, and
insurers are only allowed to use age, smoking status, and residential area, called “rating
area”, to adjust premiums for their marketplace plans. The default geographic rating
areas for each state was the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) plus the remainder
of the state that is not included in a MSA. However, states were given a chance to seek
approval from the U.S. Department of Health and Humans Services (HHS) for a different
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division method, provided that the division method was based on counties, three-digit
zip codes, or MSAs/non–MSAs. Table B.1 in the Appendix reports the division method
and descriptive statistics on rating areas for each state. Seven states use the default
“MSAs+1” to define rating areas while the remaining states won approval from the HHS
to define their own rating areas based on counties or zip codes. All states, except for
Alaska, Idaho, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and California, have rating areas composed of
counties.
This paper is about a phenomenon that we label as partial rating area offering where
marketplace plans are not sold to all counties within a rating area. The ACA regulation
mandates uniform pricing for all counties within a rating area, but it does not mandate
universal offering. In almost all situations, the HHS disapproves plans covering partial
counties, but it has no regulation on plans covering partial rating areas. We use individ-
ual qualified health plans sold in 34 federally-facilitated marketplaces in 2016 to show the
prevalence of partial rating area coverage. We find that about 57% of plans are not uni-
versally offered to all counties within rating area, and about 54% of insurance companies
exclude at least one county from their service area while selling plans to other counties
in the same rating area. We hypothesize two potential explanations. First, insurers may
selectively offer plans to risk screen consumers. This is our risk screening hypothesis. If
counties within a rating area are heterogeneous, then insurers may want to offer different
plans to better price discriminate consumers. Second, insurers may use partial rating area
coverage as a way to avoid competition and divide up a rating area with their competitors.
This is our market segmentation hypothesis.
To formalize our hypotheses and derive testable implications, we develop a simple
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model of insurer competition within a rating area. Each insurer decides which counties to
enter, and how to price their plans. We model insurer competition in a county as a form
of Bertrand competition with spurious product differentiation. In equilibrium, insurers’
entry and pricing decisions are best responding to competitors’ entry and pricing deci-
sions. We parametrize the model, and numerically compute the equilibrium for a wide
range of parameter values. The equilibrium analysis of the model shows that the partial
rating area offering phenomenon is largely explained by insurers’ incentive to risk screen
consumers. The model shows that market segmentation is hard to be achieved in equilib-
rium, as the incentive to deviate and enter competitors’ counties is too large. The model
therefore supports the risk screening hypothesis rather than the market segmentation
hypothesis. A testable implication that we obtain is that in equilibrium, insurers’ plan
offering decisions would be positively correlated, rather than negatively correlated. This
is because under risk screening, insurers pool to offering county-specific plans, while under
market segmentation, they offer plans only in counties where there are no competitors.
To test the implication of the model, we develop a non-parametric measure that quan-
tifies correlations between insurers’ plan offering decisions within a rating area. Consistent
with the model’s implication, we find that positive correlations are much more dominant
compared to negative correlations. Specifically, among rating areas where there is par-
tial offering, 90 percent have strictly positive correlations among insurers’ plan offering
decisions. This finding implies that while the ACA regulation allows price discrimination
based on rating areas and not on counties, insurers are effectively price discriminating
consumers based on counties by endogenously determining their service area within a
rating area. Empirical evidence that counties of poorer health measures tend to be un-
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derserviced by insurers provides further support for the risk screening hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the
data and provide summary statistics. In Section 3.3, we demonstrate the prevalence of
partial rating area coverage using several measures of marketing breadth. In Section 3.4,
we present our model of insurer competition. In Section 3.5, we empirically test our
hypotheses and discuss the results. Finally, in Section 3.6, we conclude.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Marketplace Public Use Files (Marketplace PUF)
Our main data come from the Marketplace Public Use Files (Marketplace PUF) provided
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). We use the Marketplace PUF
for plan year 2016. The Marketplace PUF provides characteristics of plans sold in 38
states with federally-facilitated marketplaces such as premiums, benefit and cost sharing
structure, and the set of counties where each plan is sold, i.e., service area.59 We restrict
our analysis to individual health plans. There are 4,125 individual health plans offered
in 38 federally-facilitated marketplaces in year 2016. Out of 38 marketplaces, Alaska and
Nebraska use zip codes to define rating areas. We drop these two states as our unit of
analysis is at the county level. This leaves us with 4,059 plans offered by 235 insurers in
36 states and 405 rating areas. The Marketplace PUF is composed of several files and
there exist some inconsistencies detected across different files. Out of 20,569 plan-rating
59The degree to which states rely on the HHS varies; 27 states have marketplaces that are entirely
operated by the HHS, 7 states perform in-person consumer assistance while delegating all other functions
to the HHS, and 4 states are responsible for performing their own marketplace functions, except that they
rely on the federal IT platform. In this paper, we refer to the 38 states that rely on the HHS for any
support as having federally-facilitated marketplaces.
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Table 3.1: 2016 Marketplace PUF Before Excluding Single County RAs
Plans Insurers Networks States RAs Non Single County RAs Counties Plan-RA
4,059 235 471 36 405 259 2,481 19,991
Notes: Only individual health plans offered in federally-facilitated marketplaces are
considered. Alaska and Nebraska are excluded as they use zip codes to define rating
areas.
area combinations, we cannot find service area information for 554 combinations, and
premium information for 24 combinations. We restrict to plan-rating area combinations
for which we have both service area and premium information. The restriction reduces
the number of plan-rating area combinations from 20,569 to 19,991. Table 3.1 summarizes
our sample after imposing this restriction.
As the goal of this paper is to examine partial rating area coverage, we further ex-
clude rating areas that consist of a single county. Out of 405 rating areas, we drop 146
rating areas that have only one county. Imposing this restriction excludes Florida and
South Carolina as their rating areas always consist of a single county. Table 3.2 shows
the summary statistics of the final Marketplace PUF. We have 3,442 individual health
plans offered by 214 insurers in 34 states. The number of non single county rating areas
is 259, and we have a total of 2,335 counties and 13,029 plan-rating area combinations.
Table 3.3 shows the average characteristics of plans by their metal class.
3.2.2 County Data
We supplement our analysis with two sets of county level data; the Area Health Resources
Files (AHRF) by the HHS and the County Health Rankings by the Robert Wood John-
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Table 3.2: 2016 Marketplace PUF After Excluding Single County RAs
Plans Insurers Networks States RAs Counties Plan-RA
3,442 214 423 34 259 2,335 13,029
Notes: Only individual health plans offered in federally-facilitated mar-
ketplaces are considered. Rating areas that have only one county are
excluded. Alaska and Nebraska are excluded as they use zip codes to
define rating areas. Florida and South Carolina are excluded as their
rating areas always consist of one county.
Table 3.3: Average Plan Characteristics of the 2016 Marketplace PUF
Metal No. of Plans Premium 21 EHB AV OOP Max Deductible
Catastrophic 230 170 53 6,850 6,850
Bronze 1,061 211 53 0.71 5,033 4,471
Silver 1,282 261 53 0.81 3,626 1,824
Gold 767 313 53 0.85 3,336 905
Platinum 102 373 52 0.92 1,703 201
Notes: Premium 21 represents the average monthly rate for a non-smoking 21-year-old.
EHB represents the number of essential health benefits covered. AV stands for actuarial
value. OOP Max represents the out-of-pocket maximum. For the sample restriction, see
Table 3.2 and the text.
son Foundation (CHR). The AHRF provide county level data on health resources and
socioeconomic characteristics. The CHR offer data on various health measures such as
the percentage of obesity and smokers.
3.3 Prevalence of Partial Rating Area Coverage
In this section, we use the Marketplace PUF to document the prevalence of partial rating
area coverage. We develop various measures to assess the pervasiveness of partial rating
area coverage both at the plan and insurer levels.
To make our measures easier to understand, we first introduce some notations. We
index plan by p = 1, ..., P ; rating area by r = 1, ..., R; and county by c = 1, ..., C; and
insurer by i = 1, ..., I. For each plan p = 1, ..., P, we denote by IP (p) ∈ {1, ..., I} the
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insurer for the plan p. For each r = 1, ..., R, denote by C (r) the set of counties in rating
area r. Insurance plan p and county c will be our primary focus. From the PUF data, we
have:
O (p, c) =

1 if plan p is offered in county c,
0 otherwise.
(3.3.1)
Using these notations, we can now construct several auxiliary objects of interests.
• The set of plans offered by insurer i is denoted by PI (i):
PI (i) ≡ {p : IP (p) = i} .
• The set of plans offered in county c is denoted by PC (c):
PC (c) ≡ {p : O (p, c) = 1} .
• The set of plans that are active in rating area r, i.e., offered in at least one county
in rating area r, is denoted by PR (r):
PR (r) ≡ ∪c∈C(r)PC (c) .
• The set of insurers that are active in county c is denoted by IC (c):
IC (c) ≡ {i : i = IP (p) for p ∈ PC (c)} .
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• The set of insurers that are active in rating area r is denoted by IR (r):
IR (r) ≡ ∪c∈C(r)IC (c) ≡ {i : i = IP (p) for p ∈ PR (r)} .
• The set of counties in which plan p is offered is denoted by CP (p):
CP (p) = {c : O (p, c) = 1} .
• The set of rating areas in which plan p is offered is denoted by RP (p):
RP (p) = {r : C (r) ∩ CP (p) 6= ∅} .
3.3.1 Measuring the Marketing Breadth Using Plan Coverage
We first document partial rating area coverage at the plan level. Loosely speaking, we
analyze how broadly a plan is sold to counties within a rating area (RA). We define three
measures of coverage breadth using plans’ service area. First, for each plan and for each
of the rating areas where the plan is offered,60 we define plan-RA level marketing breadth
as the fraction of counties in the rating area where the plan is sold. This measure tells
us how broadly a plan covers its rating area. This measure can be represented as follows:
for every r ∈ {1, ..., R} , and every p ∈ PR (r) ,
BP1 (p, r) =
|CP (p) ∩ C (r)|
|C (r)|
.
60We say a plan is offered in a rating area if it is sold in one of the counties in the rating area.
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Second, we develop a county level measure to evaluate how completely a county is
served by plans in the county’s rating area. Specifically, for each county, we compute the
fraction of plans offered in its rating area that are sold in the the county:
BP2 (c) =
|PC (c)|
|PR (r) : c ∈ C (r)|
.
Lastly, we develop a rating area level measure to quantify how broadly plans serve
counties in a rating area. This measure can be computed either by taking the average of
the first measure of the plans offered in the rating area, or by taking the average of the
second measure of the counties in the rating area. Both methods yield the same result:61
BP3 (r) =
1
|PR (r)|
∑
p∈PR(r)
BP1 (p, r)
=
1
|C (r)|
∑
c∈C(r)
BP2 (c) .
Table 3.4 reports the summary statistics of the three measures. About one third of
the plan-RA combinations have coverage breadth less than one, and on average, a plan is
sold to 81% of the counties in a rating area (first row). We find that out of 3,442 unique
61To see this, note that, for a given r,
BP3 (r) =
1
|PR (r)|
∑
p∈PR(r)
BP1 (p, r)
=
1
|PR (r)|
∑
p∈PR(r)
|CP (p) ∩ C (r)|
|C (r)|
=
1
|PR (r)| |C (r)|
∑
p∈PR(r)
|CP (p) ∩ C (r)| .
Note that |CP (p) ∩ C (r)| is the total number of counties in rating area r where plan p is sold; and thus∑
p∈PR(r)
|CP (p) ∩ C (r)| is the total number of plan-county combinations in rating area r. An alternative
expression for the toal number of plan-county combinations in rating area r is
∑
c∈C(r) |PC (c)| .
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Table 3.4: Plan Coverage Measures
Measure Unit Obs. Share of Obs. < 1 Mean Std
BP1 (p, r) Plan-RA 13,029 0.33 0.81 0.30
BP2 (c) County 2,335 0.57 0.79 0.25
BP3 (r) RA 259 0.63 0.87 0.15
Notes: Table reports summary statistics on the three measures of
plan coverage. See the text for details.
plans in our sample, 1,957 plans (about 57%) are partially offered in at least one rating
area. More than half of the counties are excluded by at least one plan in their rating
area, and on average, a county is served by 79% of plans in its rating area (second row).
About 63% of rating areas have at least one plan that is not universally offered across
counties (third row).
3.3.2 Measuring the Marketing Breadth Using Insurer Coverage
While the previous measures are informative of the marketing breadth at the plan level,
they ignore the fact that insurers may offer multiple plans in a rating area. For example,
suppose insurers offer different plans to each and every county in a rating area. In this
case, insurers are selling plans in all counties within a rating area, and no county is left out
by any insurer. However, the previous measures would imply that the marketing breadth
is very narrow, and they would miss the fact that the marketing breadth is actually
comprehensive at the insurer level. To mitigate these potential issues, we use insurer
coverage to define analogous measures of marketing breadth. First, for each insurer and
for each of the rating areas where the insurer is active, we compute the share of counties
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where the insurer offers at least one plan:
BI1 (i, r) =
|CI (i) ∩ C (r)|
|C (r)|
.
This measure tells us how broadly an insurer sells to counties in a rating area. Second, for
each county, we compute the fraction of insurers who sell at least one plan in the county:
BI2 (c) =
|IC (c)|
|IR (r) : c ∈ C (r)|
.
This measure tells us how completely a county is served by participating insurers in the
rating area. Third, for each rating area, we compute the average of the first measure or
the second measure to quantify how broadly insurers serve counties in a rating area:
BI3 (r) =
1
|IR (r)|
∑
i∈IR(r)
BI1 (i, r)
=
1
|C (r)|
∑
c∈C(r)
BI2 (c) .
Table 3.5 reports the summary statistics of the three measures. About one third of the
insurer-RA combinations have breadth measure that is less than one, and on average, an
insurer does not offer any plans in 15% of counties in a rating area where it participates
(first row). We find that out of 214 insurers in our sample, 116 insurers (about 54%)
engage in partial rating area marketing by not offering any plans to at least one county
that is in a rating area where they participate. Over 40% of counties are excluded by
some insurers participating in their rating areas, and on average, a county is excluded
by 17% of insurers (second row). More than half of the rating areas have some insurers
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Table 3.5: Insurer Coverage Measures
Measure Unit Obs. Share of Obs. < 1 Mean Std
BI1(i, r) Insurer-RA 1,236 0.29 0.85 0.28
BI2(c) County 2,335 0.41 0.83 0.26
BI3(r) RA 259 0.52 0.89 0.14
Notes: Table reports summary statistics on the three measures of
insurer coverage. See the text for details.
selectively serving counties, and on average, a rating area has a insurer participation rate
of 89%. (third row).
3.3.3 County and Plan Characteristics
To examine how insurers’ plan offering decisions are correlated with county characteristics,
we categorize counties based on BP2 (c), the plan participation rate in a county. We
consider five groups of counties; Least Favored if BP2 (c) is less than 20%, Less Favored if
between 20-40%, Favored if 40-60%, More Favored if 60-80%, and Most Favored if higher
than 80%.
Table 3.6 shows the average county characteristics for each county group. Counties
with lower plan participation rates tend to be much less populated and have a smaller
share of urban population. They have higher uninsured rates, fewer people with high
school diploma or more, and much fewer health providers. Counties belonging to the
Least Favored or Less Favored groups tend to have poorer health measures such as higher
share of smokers. They also have higher per capita Medicare expenditures.
We now examine the characteristics of plans sold in each county category. The first
five rows of Table 3.7 report the share of each metal class. In Least Favored and Less
Favored counties, Bronze plans are dominant and have the biggest share. On the other
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hand, in counties with higher plan participation rates (Favored, More Favored and Most
Favored counties), Silver plans have the biggest share. No Platinum plan is offered in Least
Favored counties. Premiums tend to be lower in counties with lower plan participation
rates across all metal classes.
3.3.4 Possible Explanations
Various measures of marketing breadth developed above show that partial rating area
coverage is quite common in the marketplaces. We now describe potential explanations
for this phenomenon.
Risk Screening Hypothesis. The first potential explanation is that insurers target
counties with different plans in order to better risk screen consumers. This explanation
is what we label as risk screening hypothesis. If counties within a rating area are hetero-
geneous, then offering a single plan would hurt insurers’ profit maximization problem as
the ACA rules mandate that premiums be the same for all counties. Instead, insurers
can offer county-specific plans (by differentiating plans) and charge different premiums.
For example, in the extreme case, each insurer could offer a county-specific plan to every
county within a rating area. In this case, the marketing breadth measures based on plan
coverage would be smaller than those based on insurer coverage. This is because while
insurers enter all counties within a rating area, plans are very selectively offered to coun-
ties. Figure 3.1 plots the RA-level marketing breadth based on insurer coverage, BI3(r),
against that based on plan coverage, BP3 (r), along with a 45-degree line. The figure shows
that it is common to observe rating areas where the plan coverage is substantially smaller
than the insurer coverage. Furthermore, Tables 3.6 and 3.7 suggest that insurers tend
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to avoid counties of smaller population and higher risk. When insurers do enter these
counties, they tend to offer less comprehensive plans. As not offering any plans is an
extreme form of price discrimination, and insurers tend to target high risk consumers
with less comprehensive plans, these statistics also support the risk screening hypothesis.
Market Segmentation. One other potential reason for partial offering is that insur-
ers do not wish to engage in fierce premium competition. If all insurers are active in all
counties within a rating area, they will face competition in every county which will put
downward pressure on premiums. Insurers can avoid competition by dividing up a rating
area, and serving a mutually exclusive subset of counties. This is what we label as market
segmentation hypothesis. For example, in the extreme case, insurers could be a monopoly
in counties where they sell plans. In this case, the marketing breadth measure based on
insurer coverage would be very small. Table 3.5 reports that on average, an insurer enters
85% of counties within a rating area. While suggestive, such statistics imply that market
segmentation may be hard to be achieved in equilibrium, as incentives to deviate and
enter other counties may be too large.
3.4 Model
We now develop a model of insurer competition to formalize our hypotheses and derive
testable implications. To simplify the analysis, we examine two insurers’ plan offering
decisions in a rating area with two counties.
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Figure 3.1: Insurer Coverage and Plan Coverage
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Notes: Figure compares the values of BI3(r), the rating area level marketing breadth
based on insurer coverage, to those of BP3 (r), the rating area level marketing breadth
based on plan coverage. The black line is a 45-degree line.
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3.4.1 Model Description
Market Environment. Consider a rating area that consists of two counties, county A
and B. We index counties by i ∈ {A,B}. The distribution of health expenditure θ in
county i is given by CDF Hi (θ) with corresponding PDF hi (θ) . The willingness to pay
for a type-θ consumer is given by v (θ) . We assume that v (θ) > θ. The population size
in county i is given by λi ∈ (0, 1) . Let
HR (θ) =
∑
i=A,B
λiHi (θ)
denote the CDF of the risk of the consumers in the rating area.
There are two insurance companies, insurer 1 and 2. We index insurers by j ∈ {1, 2}.
The two insurers are completely symmetric. Let pij denote the price of a health plan sold
to county i by insurer j. Each insurer chooses a vector of prices, pj = (p
A
j , p
B
j ) ≥ 0, to
maximize its profit given its competitor’s vector of prices, pj′ = (p
A
j′ , p
B
j′). If insurer j’s
price in county i is infinite, i.e., pij = +∞, it implies that insurer j is inactive in county i.
On the other hand, a finite price, pij < +∞, implies that insurer j is active in county i. If
an insurer were to offer an identical plan to both county A and county B, the regulation
requires that the prices be the same, i.e., pAj = p
B
j .
There is a fixed cost, C, associated with offering a distinctive health plan. The total
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fixed cost function is defined as
TC(pj) =

C if j is active in only one county or pAj = p
B
j <∞,
2C if pAj 6= pBj , pAj <∞, and pBj <∞.
(3.4.1)
If an insurer is active in only one county, his total fixed cost would be C. If an insurer
offers an identical plan to both counties, his total fixed cost would also be C. On the
other hand, if an insurer offers two distinctive plans, say, by marketing the two plans
under different names, then his total fixed cost would be 2C.62
Imperfect Competition. Following Fang and Wu (2016), we model the compe-
tition between the two insurers in a particular county as a form of modified “Bertrand
competition.” Different from the standard Bertrand competition in which the insurer who
posts the lower price will get the entire market, we assume that consumers cannot com-
pare price perfectly.63 Instead, a consumer receives a noisy signal about which of the two
firms has a lower price. The consumer inspects the actual price of the firm indicated by
the noisy signal, and decides whether to buy the product accordingly. The noisy signal
creates spurious product differentiation and induces imperfect competition.
Specifically, given the vector of prices posted by the two insurers in county i, (pi1, p
i
2),
62We assume that insurers can make two plans with the same benefit structures look different by
incurring fixed costs. So even when two plans have the same benefits such as deductibles, copays, and
coinsurance, insurers can market them under different labels and charge different premiums by incurring
fixed costs. This is a simplifying assumption that we impose to abstract away from endogenizing plan
design decisions.
63This is a modeling device to introduce imperfect competition in a tractable way, and not to be taken
literally.
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the noisy signal, s, is determined by:
s =

1 if pi1 − pi2 + ε ≤ 0,
2 otherwise,
where ε ∼ N (0, σ2s). It is clear that a consumer always follows the signal: if s = j, the
consumer will find out the actual price pij and decide between purchasing insurance at
price pij and staying uninsured. Hence, conditional on price vector (p
i
1, p
i
2), the probability
that a consumer considers purchasing from firm j is Φ
(
pi
j′−p
i
j
σs
)
, where Φ is the normal
CDF. Conditional on observing firm j’s price pij , the purchase decision of type-θ consumer
is very simple: purchase at price pij if and only if v (θ) ≥ pij . 64
Game between the Insurers. We denote an insurer’s monopoly profit function in
county i as ΠiM (p) where p is the insurer’s monopoly price. The monopoly profit function
is defined as
ΠiM (p) = λi
∫
v(θ)≥p
(p− θ) dHi. (3.4.2)
We assume that the fixed cost, C, is less than the optimal monopoly profit from each
county:
C < ΠiM (p
i∗
M ) where p
i∗
M = argmax
p≥0
ΠiM (p) (3.4.3)
for i = A,B. We define insurer j’s profit function as
Πj(pj , pj′) = Φ
(
pAj′ − pAj
σs
)
ΠAM (p
A
j ) + Φ
(
pBj′ − pBj
σs
)
ΠBM (p
B
j )− TC(pj). (3.4.4)
64Under the ACA regulation, insurers can vary premiums not only by rating areas, but also by age
and smoking status. The implicit assumption that we maintain throughout this section is that PDF hi
represents the health expenditure distribution conditional on age and smoking status.
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The profit function is the sum of any profits from county A and county B minus the total
fixed costs. If insurer j is inactive in county i by charging an infinite price, the profit
from county i will be zero.
Definition. Strategy profile (p∗1, p
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium of the model described above
if for j 6= j′,
Πj(p
∗
j , p
∗
j′) ≥ Πj(pj , p∗j′) for all pj ≥ 0 and j = 1, 2. (3.4.5)
In equilibrium, each insurer’s prices are optimally set in response to its competitor. The
model cannot be analytically solved, so we numerically solve the model.
Risk Screening vs. Market Segmentation. Before we present numerical results,
we first want to discuss how the model captures insurers’ incentive to risk screen consumers
based on counties, and their incentive to avoid competition by segmenting the rating
area. We first discuss the risk screening incentive. As the risk distributions of the two
counties are allowed to differ, insurers may find it profitable to offer two separate plans
to better price discriminate consumers. So if we observe insurers pooling to two separate
plans in equilibrium, it suggests that insurers selectively offer plans to price discriminate
consumers. This risk screening incentive increases in risk heterogeneity between the two
counties, while it decreases in fixed costs.
On the other hand, insurers may wish to avoid competition and be a monopoly in one
of the two counties. So if we observe insurers each being a monopoly in equilibrium, it
suggests that insurers selectively offer plans to avoid premium competition. This market
segmentation incentive increases in the accuracy of the price signal, i.e., the inverse of
σs, because when the price signal is accurate, insurers have to engage in fierce premium
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competition. In this case, they may wish to give up one county entirely, and earn the
optimal monopoly profit from the other county.
3.4.2 Parameterization
To numerically solve the model, we make several parametric assumptions. We parameter-
ize the health expenditure distribution in county i as log normal with location parameter
µi and scale parameter σi. We parameterize type-θ’s willingness to pay for a health
plan as v(θ) = (1 + ρ)θ where ρ can be interpreted as the degree of risk aversion. The
parameters of the model are therefore (C, σs, ρ), and (µi, σi, λi) for i = A,B.
Key parameters of interest are C, σB, and σs. The fixed cost, C, is of interest because
it affects insurers’ incentive to offer county-specific plans. The scale parameter of the
health expenditure distribution in county B, σB, is of interest because it determines the
risk heterogeneity between the two counties. The standard deviation of the pricing signal,
σs, is of interest because it determines the degree of premium competition between the
two insurers.
We compute the equilibrium of the model for various values of (C, σB, σs), while fixing
the values of the remaining parameters. We fix the values of the remaining parameters
as follows; the risk aversion parameter, ρ, is set to 1; the health expenditure parameters
of county A, µA and σA, are set such that the mean monthly health expenditure is $550,
and the standard deviation is one fourth of its mean; µB is identical to µA; county B is of
higher risk compared to county A with σB ≥ σA; and finally, both counties are of equal
size with λA = λB = 0.5.
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3.4.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Before we present results from our equilibrium analysis, it is useful to categorize an
insurer’s pricing decision, pj = (p
A
j , p
B
j ), into four groups: 1) charge different and finite
prices to county A and county B (two separate plans), 2) charge the same finite price
to both county A and county B (RA plan), 3) charge a finite price to county A only (A
only plan), and 4) charge a finite price to county B only (B only plan). The reason why
we categorize insurers’ pricing decisions in this manner is because it would be easier to
present equilibria of the game in terms of the resulting market structures, rather than in
terms of equilibrium prices.
Depending on insurers’ pricing decisions, various market structures could be observed
in equilibrium, from duopoly in every county to monopoly in every county. Furthermore, if
a specific market structure is observed in equilibrium, then the corresponding equilibrium
premiums satisfy inequality (3.4.5) when each insurer’s choice set is restricted to prices
that yield the specific market structure. For example, if we observe insurer 1 offering an A
only plan and insurer 2 offering a B only plan in equilibrium, then insurer 1’s equilibrium
pricing strategy is p1 = (p
A∗
M ,+∞), and insurer 2’s equilibrium pricing strategy is p2 =
(+∞, pB∗M ) where pi∗M is the optimal monopoly premium as in equation (3.4.3).
We now present market structures observed in equilibrium as functions of the key
parameters, (C, σB, σs). The results are reported in Figure 3.2. Each panel uses a constant
value of C and indicates the equilibrium market structures in the σB − σs plane. Values
of σB range from σA to 2σA. Values of σs range from 27.5 to 550, which represent 5%
and 100% of the mean health expenditure in county A, respectively. We set values of C
111
such that for all values of (σB, σs), the duopoly profit in county B is higher than C.
According to Figure 3.2, only two market structures are observed in equilibrium (ex-
cluding the case of σB = σA); pooling to an RA plan or pooling to two separate plans.
This suggests that in equilibrium, insurers’ plan offering decisions are positively correlated.
Pooling to an RA plan is more likely when the fixed costs are large, the risk heterogeneity
is small, and consumers receive rather inaccurate information about prices. Pooling to an
RA plan implies that there is no partial rating area offering, and all plans are offered in all
counties within a rating area. In this case, both BP3 (r) and B
I
3(r) would be 1. According
to Table 3.4, about 37% of the rating areas in our sample fall into this category.
The model implies insurers engage in risk screening, i.e., they pool to offering two sep-
arate plans, when the fixed costs are small, the risk heterogeneity is large, and consumers
are very price sensitive. Under this market structure, BP3 (r) would be 0.5 while B
I
3(r)
would be 1. Figure 3.1 shows that in our data, it is quite common to observe rating areas
where BI3(r) is much higher than B
P
3 (r).
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Figure 3.2 also implies that market segmentation is hard to be observed in equilibrium.
For all parameter values considered in the figure, we cannot observe (A only plan, B only
plan) as an equilibrium market structure. This is because in our model, the incentive
to deviate from (A only plan, B only plan) and enter the other county is too large. For
example, suppose insurer 1 is a monopoly in county A and insurer 2 is a monopoly in
county B. In this case, insurer 1 cannot do worse by expanding the plan coverage, and
making its A only plan an RA plan. This result suggests that without other mechanisms to
65While there are many rating areas with BP3 (r) > B
I
3(r), for these rating areas, the difference |BP3 (r)−
BI3(r)| is small. On the other hand, for rating areas with BP3 (r) < BI3(r), the difference is fairly large.
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penalize deviating behaviors, market segmentation is hard to be achieved in equilibrium.
To sum, the model supports the risk screening hypothesis, rather than the market
segmentation hypothesis. A testable implication that we obtain from the model is that
in equilibrium, insurers’ plan offering decisions would be positively correlated rather than
negatively correlated. We now turn to the data to empirically test this implication.
3.5 Empirical Results
The equilibrium analysis of the model suggests that partial rating area offerings are
largely explained by the risk screening hypothesis, and as a result, we can expect to
observe a positive correlation among insurers’ plan offering decisions. To test the model’s
implication, we now develop statistics that could measure correlations among insurers’
plan offering decisions.
3.5.1 Correlation Construction
Using the notations introduced in Section 3.3, we construct a non-parametric measure of
correlations between insurers’ plan offering decisions. Recall that the set of plans offered
by insurer i is denoted by PI (i), and the set of plans offered in rating area r is denoted
by PR (r). Then, for each insurer i who is active in rating area r, i.e., i ∈ IR(r), we can
define the set of plans insurer i offers in rating area r as:
PI,R (i, r) = PI (i) ∩ PR (r) .
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Figure 3.2: Nash Equilibrium and (C, σB, σs)
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Notes: Figure reports the equilibrium market structure for various values of (C, σB , σs). Each panel uses
a constant value of C, and reports the equilibrium market structure for different values of (σB , σs). The
distribution of health expenditure in county A is held constant at µA =6.2796 and σA =0.246. The
mean health expenditure in county A is therefore E(θA) = $550 and the standard deviation is $137.5.
To examine how risk heterogeneity affects insurers’ plan offering choices, the model assumes county B is
of higher risk compared to county A. Specifically, we assume µB = µA and σB ≥ σA. The figure holds
constant the rest of the parameter values at λA = 0.5, λB = 0.5, and ρ = 1. For all configurations of the
parameter values considered in the figure, the fixed cost, C, is always less than or equal to the monopoly
profit from each county, i.e., C ≤ ΠiM (pi∗M ) for i = A,B.
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For each insurer i ∈ IR (r), and for each county c ∈ C(r), define an indicator O (i, c) as
follows:
O (i, c) =

1 if i ∈ IC (c) ,
0 if i /∈ IC (c) .
where IC (c) is the set of insurers who are active in county c. Define, for each i ∈
IR (r) , i′ ∈ IR (r) \i, and for each c ∈ C (r), c′ ∈ C (r) \ {c} :
1̂
(
i, i′; c, c′
)
=

1 if O (i, c) = O (i′, c) & O (i, c′) = O (i′, c′) ,
−1 if O (i, c) 6= O (i′, c) & O (i, c′) 6= O (i′, c′) ,
0 otherwise.
In words, 1̂ (i, i′; c, c′) takes value 1 if insurers i and i′ are completely aligned regarding
their entry decisions in the two counties; −1 if they are completely opposed; and 0 for
any other cases. Our measure of correlation is based on this indicator, 1̂ (i, i′; c, c′) :
CORRI (r) ≡
∑
i∈IR(r)
∑
i′∈IR(r)\{i}
∑
c∈C(r)
∑
c′∈C(r)\{c} 1̂ (i, i
′; c, c′)∑
i∈IR(r)
∑
i′∈IR(r)\{i}
∑
c∈C(r)
∑
c′∈C(r)\{c} 1
. (3.5.1)
The denominator can be simplified. Let nC (r) = |C (r)| be the number of counties in
rating area r; and let nI (r) = |IR (r)| be the number of active insurers in rating area r.
Then
∑
i∈IR(r)
∑
i′∈IR(r)\{i}
∑
c∈C(r)
∑
c′∈C(r)\{c}
1 = nI (r)nC (r) [nI (r)− 1] [nC (r)− 1] .
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Hence,
CORRI (r) =
∑
i∈IR(r)
∑
i′∈IR(r)\{i}
∑
c∈C(r)
∑
c′∈C(r)\{c} 1̂ (i, i
′; c, c′)
nI (r)nC (r) [nI (r)− 1] [nC (r)− 1]
. (3.5.2)
3.5.2 Illustrative Examples
Example 1. We first compute correlations for market structures implied by the model
in Section 3.4. First, suppose there is a pooling to an RA plan. In this case, CORRI(r)
would be 1. Second, suppose there is a pooling to two separate plans. Then, CORRI(r)
would also be 1. Finally, suppose insurer 1 offers an A only plan, while insurer 2 offers a
B only plan. Then, CORRI(r) would be -1. This exercise suggests that our correlation
measure is well suited to test the implication that insurers’ offering decisions are posi-
tively correlated under the risk screening hypothesis, while they are negatively correlated
under the market segmentation hypothesis.
Example 2. Consider a rating area r with two counties, c1 and c2. There are two
insurance companies, insurer 1 and insurer 2, and a total of 5 plans, {a, b, d, e, f} . Suppose
that PI ,R (1, r) = {a, b} , and PI ,R (2, r) = {d, e, f} . Suppose further that PC (c1) =
{a, d, e} , and PC (c2) = {b, e, f}. In words, insurer 1 offers plan a in county c1 and plan
b in county c2; insurer 2 offers plans d and e in county c1 and plans e and f in county c2.
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The numerator of the correlation measure is
∑
i′∈IR(r)\{1}
∑
c∈C(r)
c′∈C(r)\{c}
1̂
(
1, i′; c, c′
)
+
∑
i′∈IR(r)\{2}
∑
c∈C(r)
c′∈C(r)\{c}
1̂
(
2, i′; c, c′
)
= 1̂ (1, 2; c1, c2) + 1̂ (1, 2; c2, c1) + 1̂ (2, 1; c1, c2) + 1̂ (2, 1; c2, c1) = 4.
The denominator is 2× 2 = 4. The correlation measure is therefore 1, suggesting that the
two firms are perfectly aligned in their county entry decisions.
Example 3. Consider a rating area r with two counties, c1 and c2. There are two
insurance companies, insurer 1 and insurer 2, and a total of 5 plans, {a, b, d, e, f} . Suppose
that PI ,R (1, r) = {a, b} , and PI ,R (2, r) = {d, e, f} . Suppose further that PC (c1) =
{a, b} , and PC (c2) = {d, e, f} . In words, insurer 1 offers plans a and b in county c1, and
insurer 2 offers plans d, e and f in county c2. The numerator of the correlation measure
is
∑
i′∈IR(r)\{1}
∑
c∈C(r)
c′∈C(r)\{c}
1̂
(
1, i′; c, c′
)
+
∑
i′∈IR(r)\{2}
∑
c∈C(r)
c′∈C(r)\{c}
1̂
(
2, i′; c, c′
)
= 1̂ (1, 2; c1, c2) + 1̂ (1, 2; c2, c1) + 1̂ (2, 1; c1, c2) + 1̂ (2, 1; c2, c1) = −4.
The denominator is 2 × 2 = 4. The correlation measure is therefore −1, suggesting that
the two insurance companies are perfectly misaligned in their county entry decisions.
Example 4. Consider a rating area r with two counties, c1 and c2. There are three
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insurance companies, insurer 1,2, and 3, and a total of 7 plans, {a, b, d, e, f, g, h} . Suppose
that PI ,R (1, r) = {a, b, d} , PI ,R (2, r) = {e, f} , and PI ,R (3, r) = {g, h} . Suppose further
that PC (c1) = {a, b, d, e} , and PC (c2) = {e, f, g, h} . In words, insurer 1 offers plans a, b
and d in county c1; insurer 2 offers plan e in both counties and plan f in county c2; and
insurer 3 offers plans g and h in county c2. The numerator of the correlation measure is
∑
i′∈IR(r)\{1}
∑
c∈C(r)
c′∈C(r)\{c}
1̂
(
1, i′; c, c′
)
+
∑
i′∈IR(r)\{2}
∑
c∈C(r)
c′∈C(r)\{c}
1̂
(
2, i′; c, c′
)
+
∑
i′∈IR(r)\{3}
∑
c∈C(r)
c′∈C(r)\{c}
1̂
(
3, i′; c, c′
)
= 1̂ (1, 2; c1, c2) + 1̂ (1, 2; c2, c1) + 1̂ (1, 3; c1, c2) + 1̂ (1, 3; c2, c1)
+1̂ (2, 1; c1, c2) + 1̂ (2, 1; c2, c1) + 1̂ (2, 3; c1, c2) + 1̂ (2, 3; c2, c1)
+1̂ (3, 1; c1, c2) + 1̂ (3, 1; c2, c1) + 1̂ (3, 2; c1, c2) + 1̂ (3, 2; c2, c1)
= 0 + 0 + (−1) + (−1) + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + (−1) + (−1) + 0 + 0
= −4.
The denominator is nI (r)nC (r) [nI (r)− 1] [nC (r)− 1] = 3× 2× 2× 1 = 12. The corre-
lation measure is therefore −13 . This suggests that overall, the insurers in the rating area
are negatively correlated in their county entry decisions.
3.5.3 Empirical Correlations
We now compute correlations for rating areas in our sample. The goal is to see if positive
correlations are much more likely to be observed, as implied by the model. We exclude
rating areas where there is a single insurer, because our correlation measure can only be
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computed for rating areas with at least two insurers. This restriction reduces our sample
size from 259 rating areas to 247 rating areas.
Table 3.8 reports the results. For rating areas where all insurers offer at least one plan
in every county, the correlation measure is one. About 45% of the sample (112 rating
areas) fall into this category. The remaining 55% of the sample (135 rating areas) have at
least one insurer who selectively enters counties. Our focus is on these rating areas as we
are interested in explaining the partial offering decisions. From the fourth row, the table
reports correlation measures of these rating areas. Of the 135 rating areas with some
partial entry, 121 rating areas have correlations that are strictly positive, while only 12
rating areas have correlations that are strictly negative. The mean correlation is positive
at 0.34. Figure 3.3 reports the histogram of the correlations for rating areas with some
partial entry. It has a very thin left tail as rating areas with negative correlations are
very rare.
The empirical findings reported in Table 3.8 and Figure 3.3 agree with the model’s
implication that insurers’ plan offering decisions would be positively correlated in equi-
librium. This result suggests that the partial rating area offering phenomenon is better
explained by the risk screening hypothesis rather than the market segmentation hypoth-
esis. The risk screening hypothesis is further supported by Table 3.6 which reports the
average county characteristics based on insurers’ plan offering decisions. As described
earlier, counties with poorer heath measures tend to be excluded by insurers. These
findings imply that while the ACA regulation allows price discrimination based on rating
areas and not on counties, insurers are effectively price discriminating consumers based
on counties by endogenously determining their service area within a rating area.
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Figure 3.3: Histogram for Correlation Measure CORRI(r)
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Notes: Figure reports the histogram of the correlation measure CORRI(r) defined in
Equation 3.5.1. The sample is restricted to rating areas that have at least two counties
and two participating insurers, where there is some partial entry.
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Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics of the Correlation Measure CORRI(r)
Number of RAs 247
Number of RAs with No Partial Entry 112
Number of RAs with Some Partial Entry 135
: Number of RAs with CORR > 0 121
: Number of RAs with CORR == 0 2
: Number of RAs with CORR < 0 12
: Mean 0.34
: Median 0.34
: Standard deviation 0.27
Notes: Table reports descriptive statistics of the correlation measure CORRI(r) defined
in Equation 3.5.1. The sample is restricted to rating areas with at least two counties and
two participating insurers, and the first row reports the number of such rating areas. The
second row reports the number of rating areas where all insurers offer at least one plan
in every county. These rating areas have a correlation measure of 1 by construction. The
third row reports the number of rating areas where some insurers do not offer any plan in
some county. From the fourth row, the sample is restricted to the rating areas included
in the third row; the rating areas where there is some partial entry.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper documents the pervasiveness of partial rating area coverage in the ACA mar-
ketplaces. Using both theoretical and empirical approaches, we argue that insurers in the
marketplaces price discriminate consumers based on county, which is a much narrower
definition of residential area than rating areas. As the regulation mandates uniform pric-
ing, but not universal offering within a rating area, insurers endogenously determine their
service area to price discriminate consumers based on county. We find evidence that price
discrimination takes a form of offering county-specific plans or completely excluding high
risk counties from their service area.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Descriptive Evidence on Family Moral Hazard
I provide descriptive evidence that parents’ decision to buy long-term care insurance
undermines children’s informal care incentives. Children’s informal care behaviors may
be affected not only by parents’ long-term care insurance coverage but also by other
important factors such as the opportunity costs of providing care. To better control for
the determinants of informal care other than long-term care insurance coverage, I again
take advantage of the subjective beliefs about informal care reported in the HRS (BIC).66
Using healthy respondents who do not yet own long-term care insurance in the current
interview, I split the sample by their beliefs about informal care in the current interview
and long-term care insurance purchase choices in the next interview. For each of the four
subsamples, I compute the share of respondents who receive informal care from children
in the next interview. The goal is to see if respondents who buy long-term care insurance
66See Section 2.2.2 for the description of these beliefs.
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Figure A.1: Long-Term Care Insurance Purchase and Informal Care
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Notes: Sample is limited to healthy individuals who do not yet own long-term care insurance in the
current interview. I split the sample by their current beliefs about the availability of informal care and
long-term care insurance purchase choices in the next interview. For each of the four subsamples, the
figure reports the share receiving informal care from children in the next interview.
receive less informal care conditional on beliefs about informal care before the insurance
purchase. Figure A.1 shows that, conditional on beliefs about informal care, parents
who buy long-term care insurance are less likely to receive care from children. To the
extent that beliefs about informal care are reasonable measures of informal care before
the insurance purchase, this finding serves as suggestive evidence that long-term care
insurance undermines children’s informal care incentives.
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A.2 Child Inheritance Value
The child’s value from an inheritance is determined by assuming that the child optimally
consumes her share of bequests, B := 0.5wPa , over the next T0 periods.
67 Given that the
child is risk-averse, she will allocate B equally over the next T0 periods. Let x denote
the equally allocated amount. Using β = 11+r , I obtain x = B
1−β
1−βT0 . As the child’s
income is likely to affect the consumption value of bequests, I assume that the child
receives a constant income, y, over the next T0 periods. This constant income depends
on whether or not the child has some college education. I use the average child family
income conditional on college education to calibrate y. In each of the next T0 periods, the
child consumes y + x. The child’s value from inheritance, ΠKd , is given as the discounted
sum of the consumption utilities over the next T0 periods:
ΠKd =
1− βT0
1− β
log(y + x). (A.2.1)
A.3 Child Family Income Estimation
The HRS reports the annual family income of the respondents’ children as bracketed
values: below $10K, between $10K-35K, between $35K-70K, above $35K, and above
$70K. I put children in the “above $35K” bracket into the “$35K-70K” bracket. As each
period is two years in my model, I double the threshold values and define ŷKi by the
67I use T0 = 5.
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following:
ŷKi =

1 if below $20K,
2 if between $20K-70K,
3 if between $70K-140K,
4 and if above $140K.
I assume there is an underlying continuous family income, ỹKi , which is defined by the
following equation
log(ỹKi ) = x
K
i γ + ηi (A.3.1)
where
xKi γ = γ1,1 + γ1,2age
K
i + γ1,3(age
K
i )
2 + γ1,4home
K
i + γ1,5edu
K
i + γ1,6female
K
i
+ γ1,7female
K
i ∗marriedKi + γ1,8(1− femaleKi ) ∗marriedKi
+ eKi ∗
{
γ2,1 + γ2,2age
K
i + γ2,3(age
K
i )
2 + γ2,4female
K
i + γ2,5edu
K
i
+ γ2,6female
K
i ∗ (eKi,−1) + γ2,7(1− femaleKi ) ∗ (eKi,−1)
}
and ηi follows an i.i.d. normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ
2
η. The log
likelihood function is given by
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logL(γ, ση|ŷK , xK) =
N∑
i=1
logP (ŷKi |xKi ; γ, ση) (A.3.2)
where
P (ŷKi = 1|xKi ) = Φση(log(20K)− xKi γ|xKi ),
P (ŷKi = 2|xKi ) = Φση(log(70K)− xKi γ)− Φσ(log(20K)− xKi γ),
P (ŷKi = 3|xKi ) = Φση(log(140K)− xKi γ)− Φσ(log(70K)− xKi γ), and
P (ŷKi = 4|xKi ) = 1− Φση(log(140K)− xKi γ|xKi ).
Φση is the cumulative distribution function of ηi. To estimate Equation (A.3.2), I use
data on respondents’ children from the HRS 1998-2010. I use children aged between 21
and 60. The results of the estimation are reported in Table A.1. I use these estimates, γ̂,
to construct the deterministic family income function in Equation (2.3.12).
A.4 Additional Tables and Figures
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Table A.1: Child Family Income Estimates
Estimate
Constant 8.3439
Age 0.0607
Age2 -0.0006
Home 0.4090
Female 0.3114
Female×Married 0.5835
Male×Married 0.3451
Work 0.8525
Work×Age -0.0112
Work×Age2 0.0000
Work×Female -0.3655
Work×College 0.3393
Work×Female×Work−1 0.2306
Work×Male×Work−1 0.3667
ση 0.5002
Notes: Table reports estimated coefficients for the two-
year child family income process.
Figure A.2: Competitive Equilibrium
Annual premium
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Notes: Figure reports the simulated average cost curve (AC) and the simulated average revenue curve
(AR) for the standard policy under default pricing (all healthy 60-year-olds pay the same premium). The
simulation sample consists of healthy 60-year-old parents and their children from the HRS 2002. The
equilibrium premium is $5,732 and the equilibrium coverage rate is 6.1 percent.
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Table A.2: Moments Generated with First-Stage Policy Functions
Data First-Stage
Policy Functions
LTCI purchase rate 0.14 0.14
Among parents w/ light LTC needs
Light informal care rate 0.37 0.35
Intensive informal care rate 0.18 0.13
Paid home care rate 0.50 0.51
Nursing home rate 0.07 0.04
Among parents w/ severe LTC needs
Light informal care rate 0.09 0.05
Intensive informal care rate 0.29 0.26
Paid home care rate 0.30 0.35
Nursing home rate 0.36 0.30
Child employment rate 0.63 0.65
Parent mean consumption
Age 60s 40956 40421
Age 70s 38065 40031
Age 80s 36517 37151
Age 90s 35114 32582
Notes: Table reports empirical moments and simulated moments. Simulated moments
are generated using the first-stage empirical policy functions of the CCP estimation.
Formal care rates are among parents who have specified health statuses and do not
receive informal care from children. Empirical consumption moments are based on
the CAMS data.
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Figure A.3: Density of Informal Care Measure (IC0)
Informal care measure (IC0)
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Notes: Figure reports the density of IC0 conditional on IC0 > 0. For each family in the simulation
sample, IC0 is defined as the number of total informal care periods divided by the number of total bad
health periods when there is no private long-term care insurance. About 55 percent of families have
IC0 = 0. This is consistent with the data patterns; Table 2.3 shows that among parents with long-term
care needs, 55 percent do not receive any informal care from children.
Figure A.4: Wealth and Insurance Selection
Parent wealth decile
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Notes: Left panel reports the share of parents who buy long-term care insurance at the equilibrium
premium ($5,732), by parent wealth decile (wealth is measured at parent age 60). Right panel reports the
average present-discounted value of the lifetime formal care expenses when parents own long-term care
insurance.
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Figure A.5: Equilibrium without Family Moral Hazard
Annual premium
5286 5732
×104
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
AR
Benchmark
AC
Benchmark
AR
No FMH
AC
No FMH
Notes: Black solid line and black dashed line represent the average cost curve and the average revenue
curve, respectively, of the benchmark model where children can react to parents’ insurance coverage. The
equilibrium coverage rate is 6.1 percent. Red solid line and red dashed line represent the average cost
curve and the average revenue curve, respectively, when there is no family moral hazard. The equilibrium
coverage rate is 8.6 percent.
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Figure A.6: Equilibrium without Informal Care
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Notes: Black solid line and black dashed line represent the average cost curve and the average revenue
curve, respectively, of the benchmark model where children can provide informal care. The equilibrium
coverage rate is 6.1 percent. Red solid line and red dashed line represent the average cost curve and the
average revenue curve, respectively, when there is no informal care. The equilibrium coverage rate is 9.5
percent.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
Table B.1: Rating Area by State
State Units of RAs RAs Non Single Counties FFM
County RAs
Alabama MSAs+1 13 8 67 1
Alaska 3-Digit Zip Codes 3 29 1
Arizona Counties 7 5 15 1
Arkansas Counties 7 7 75 1
California Counties/3-Digit Zip Codes 19 58 0
Colorado Counties 9 4 64 0
Connecticut Counties 8 0 8 0
Delaware Counties 1 1 3 1
DC Counties 1 0 1 0
Florida Counties 67 0 67 1
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Georgia Counties 16 16 159 1
Hawaii Counties 1 1 5 1
Idaho 3-Digit Zip Codes 7 44 0
Illinois Counties 13 12 102 1
Indiana Counties 17 16 92 1
Iowa Counties 7 7 99 1
Kansas Counties 7 7 105 1
Kentucky Counties 8 8 120 0
Louisiana Counties 8 8 64 1
Maine Counties 4 4 16 1
Maryland Counties 4 4 24 0
Massachusetts 3-Digit Zip Codes 7 14 0
Michigan Counties 16 15 83 1
Minnesota Counties 9 9 87 0
Mississippi Counties 6 6 82 1
Missouri Counties 10 10 115 1
Montana Counties 4 4 56 1
Nebraska 3-Digit Zip Codes 4 93 1
Nevada Counties 4 3 17 1
New Hampshire Counties 1 1 10 1
New Jersey Counties 1 1 21 1
New Mexico MSAs+1 5 2 33 1
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New York Counties 8 8 62 0
North Carolina Counties 16 16 100 1
North Dakota MSAs+1 4 2 53 1
Ohio Counties 17 17 88 1
Oklahoma MSAs+1 5 4 77 1
Oregon Counties 7 7 36 1
Pennsylvania Counties 9 9 67 1
Rhode Island Counties 1 1 5 0
South Carolina Counties 46 0 46 1
South Dakota Counties 4 4 66 1
Tennessee Counties 8 8 95 1
Texas MSAs+1 26 16 254 1
Utah Counties 6 5 29 1
Vermont Counties 1 1 14 0
Virginia MSAs+1 12 12 134 1
Washington Counties 5 4 39 0
West Virginia Counties 11 10 55 1
Wisconsin Counties 16 14 72 1
Wyoming MSAs+1 3 1 23 1
Notes: FFM is an indicator for having a federally-facilitated marketplace.
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